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I. Introduction
Today, the regulation of oil and gas exploration and production ac-
tivities by substate governmental units has reemerged after a lengthy qui-
escent period.' Oil and gas activities obviously take place where the oil
and gas is located. Historically that has been in rural areas, although
there are clear exceptions. 2 Population growth and urban sprawl has
brought the citizenry to where the oil and gas wells are. People who
move to the country not only want urban amenities, they also want the
"peace and quiet" that they believe exists in the idyllic rural surround-
ings. One does not want to exchange the noise of the bus or emergency
medical vehicle for the noise of the "pump jack" and the drilling rig. An
additional factor causing this increase in substate unit regulation is the
expansion of land use powers from municipalities to counties. Histori-
cally, municipalities were the substate units that engaged in land use
regulation. Counties, the usual provider of governmental services in the
rural regions of the United States, were often the stepchild of substate
units lacking most of the traditional police powers exercised by the cities.
In addition, counties were often left out of the home rule movement that
transformed local governmental law in the 2 0th Century. As will be ex-
plained later, the concept of home rule gives substate units substantially
greater freedom to exercise the t of home rule gives substate units sub-
stantially greater freedom to exercise the police power than had existed
prior to the adoption of constitutional and statutory home rule regimes.
All of these developments now make the understanding of local land use
regulatory mechanisms important for all of the interested parties in oil
Throughout this paper I will be referring to either substate or local governmental
units. For purposes of this paper those terms refer to any governmental unit such as a
county, parish, borough, township, city, regional special district or the like.
2 Various Kansas municipalities and Oklahoma City have been regulating oil and gas
operations within their jurisdictions starting in the 1920s. American Bar Association,
Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas 55-56 (1938).
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and gas development, royalty interest owners, working interest owners
and surface owners.
II. Primer On Local Governmental Zoning Powers
Land use regulation through zoning, planning and subdivision regu-
latory mechanisms has a reasonably long history.3 New York City en-
acted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916. But it was two
subsequent events that led to the widespread use of zoning throughout
the urban areas of the Jnited States. The most important of the two was
the Supreme Court's "blessing" of zoning as being a constitutionally
valid exercise of the police power in the landmark decision of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.4 The second event was the development of
the Standard Zoning Enabling Act and the Standard Planning Enabling
Act by the United States Department of Commerce under the guidance of
Herbert Hoover in 1924. Within a few years of these two events, over 45
states had adopted statutes authorizing at least some of their substate
units to engage in comprehensive zoning and/or planning efforts.s Euclid
and the SZEA eliminated the legal or constitutional constraints on the
exercise of comprehensive land use regulatory powers by substate units.
Clearly the political climate was such that within a relatively short Feriod
of time, zoning at the city level became a nearly universal practice.
Home Rule Authority
For local governmental units that have home rule authority, either
granted by the State Constitution or by state legislation, the power to
zone arises from the charter of the local governmental unit. Essentially a
home rule provision transfers to the substate unit, the full breadth and
extent of the police power that otherwise resides in the State Legislature.
Grants of home rule power differ from state-to-state, but for our pur-
poses, the major categories of home rule power deal with whether that
power is preemptible or non-preemptible. Most states provide for pre-
emptible home rule power.7 Texas is a good example of a preemptible
Earlier instances of zoning for individual uses, rather than in a comprehensive
manner, were prevalent in the latter part of the 19th Century and the early decades of the
20'h Century. In 1919, the Supreme Court validated a "single use" zoning ordinance pro-
hibiting oil storage facilities within 300 feet of a dwelling house. Pierce Oil Corp. v. City
of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 39 S.Ct. 172, 63 L.Ed. 381 (1919). Other examples of "single
use" zoning ordinances being challenged include: Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915); Ex parte Hadacheck, 132 P. 584 (Cal. 1913), aff'd, Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Exparte Kelso, 82 P. 241 (Cal. 1905).
4 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
s U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Zoning Laws and Ordinances 2 (1928).
6 Houston, Texas is one of only a few urban areas not covered by a comprehensive
zoning ordinance.
7 Osborne Reynolds, Local Government Law §§ 35-39 (2d ed. 2001).
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home rule state.8 A preemptible home rule system means that while sub-
state units have all of the power that the State has, the State may, through
the exercise of its legislative prerogative, limit, condition, or abrogate the
substate unit's power. But there are powerful political forces in play that
in many cases prevent the enactment of state statutes that deprive sub-
state units of their powers. In Ohio, the Legislature originally enacted a
statute designed to set forth the limits of certain sub-state unit's powers
to regulate oil and gas operations.9 The statute, however, did not attempt
to preempt all local regulation of oil and gas drilling operations. It pro-
vided in part::
This chapter or rules adopted under it shall not be construed to pre-
vent any municipal corporation, county, or township from enacting
and enforcing health and safety standards for the drilling and explo-
ration for oil and gas, provided that such standards are not less re-
strictive than this chapter or the rules adopted thereunder by the di-
vision of mineral resources management. No county or township
shall adopt or enforce any ordinances, resolutions, rules, or re-
quirements relative to the minimum acreage requirements for drill-
ing units; minimum distances from which a new well or related pro-
duction facilities may be drilled or an existing well deepened,
plugged back, or reopened to .... No county or township shall re-
quire any permit or licenses for the drilling, operation, production,
plugging, or abandonment of any oil or gas well, not any fee, bond
or other security, or insurance for any activity associated with the
drilling, operation, production, or abandonment of a well, except for
the permit provided for in section 4513.34 of the Revised Code and
any bond or other security associated therewith.'0
The Legislature authorized partial preemption of some sub-state
units' powers but clearly did not intend to remove sub-state regulation."
But even this attempt to set up a preemption regime was repealed by the
Legislature in 2004. Nonetheless it remains clear that the State Legisla-
ture may preempt sub-state unit regulation by either general law cities or
preemptible home rule cities should it so choose. To date, however, only
Louisiana,12 Michigan,13 New York 4 and Wyoming" have statutes that
S Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5. See also Idaho Const. Art. XII, § 2; Utah Const. Art. XI, §
5.
9 Ohio Rev.Code § 1509.39, repealed by 2004 H 278.
10 Ohio Rev.Code § 1509.39, repealed by 2004 H 278.
1 A more in-depth analysis of this preemption issue is provided infra at text accom-
panying notes 42-98.
12 La. R. S. § 30:28(F).
13 Mich.Comp.L. § 125.3205.
24 N.Y.Env.Cons.L. § 23-0303(2).
Is Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 18-5-201.
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totally preempt one or more substate units from regulating oil and gas
operations.
Two oil and gas producing states, California,16 and Colorado 7 have
non-pre-emptible home rule constitutional provisions. In theory, that
means that as to matters relating exclusively to local or municipal affairs,
the state has no power to act. In other words, the home rule unit has sole
authority to regulate on matters relating to local or municipal affairs. As
to matters of statewide concern or hybrid state/local concern, these two
states treat local powers as preemptible. As a practical matter, the regula-
tion of oil and gas operations is not going to be treated as a matter of ex-
clusive local concern, therefore the preemption analysis for these states is
similar to the analysis in preemptible home rule states.
General Law Authority
Prior to the adoption of home rule authority, all substate units were
treated as essentially "creatures" of the state.' 8 General law local gov-
ernmental units could only exercise such power as was expressly granted
them by the State Legislature. In addition, under Dillon's Rule, a com-
mon law doctrine employed by many courts, the grant of power to sub-
state units is to be narrowly interpreted.'9 The principal purpose underly-
ing the development of the SZEA in the 1920s was to provide a model
enabling act to be passed by state legislatures clearly giving substate
units the power to zone and plan. Without such an enabling act, substate
units may not have had the authority to zone. Concurrent with the trend
towards the granting of home rule authority, many state legislatures have
granted general law cities equivalent powers without the need to attain
home rule status. For example, Texas provides that all general law mu-
nicipalities in the state have the power "to adopt ordinances for good
government, peace or order which are necessary or proper for carrying
out a power granted by law."20 While cities in most states have substan-
tial home rule or enabling authority to engage in zoning and planning
regulation, other types of sub-state units, including counties, do not pos-
sess analogous authority. Thus counties in Texas, in general, lack the
power to zone and plan.2' But in some 37 states, counties may possess
16 Cal.Const. art IX, § 5(a).fs
17 Colo. Const. art. IX, § 9.
18 See e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
19 O.Reynolds, note 7 supra at § 49. The classic definition of Dillon's Rule provides
that substate units have (1) those powers expressly conferred upon them by the state con-
stitution or by state statute, (2) those powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted and (3) those powers essential to the declared objects and
purposes of the substate unit. Id.
20 Tex.Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 51.001. See also N.D. Cent. Code § 40-05-01
21 Tex.Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 231.001 et seq. The State Legislature has given a
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home rule or very broad enabling act power.22 Whether or not such
power is exercised will depend on many factors but as counties gain
population the pressure to regulate oil and gas drilling and production
activities will undoubtedly increase.
Constitutionality
As discussed above, the constitutionality of zoning regulation was a
hotly debated issue until Euclid was decided. Prior to Euclid several state
supreme courts had invalidated zoning efforts using a substantive due
process argument.23 Euclid involved a facial substantive due process at-
tack on a zoning ordinance that divided the City into a hierarchy of zon-
ing districts from single family residential to industrial. Even though the
owner of the land in question alleged that the market value of the land
would be diminished from $ 10,000/acre to $ 2500/acre, the Supreme
Court found that the comprehensive zoning ordinance on its face had a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
At that time the regulatory takings jurisprudence set in motion by Justice
Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon,24 had not fully
blossomed so that the Euclid opinion may not be a definitive statement
on the regulatory takings limits on zoning of oil and gas operations.
While Euclid involved a facial attack on a zoning ordinance, the
Supreme Court shortly after Euclid decided Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge,2 5 an as-applied challenge to a zoning ordinance. While Euclid
had taken a "soft glance" or deferential approach to judicial review of
zoning decisions, such as where to draw the district lines and what uses
to allow in each district, Nectow clearly suggested that the federal courts
would be taking a "hard look" at zoning decisions. In Nectow the court
invalidated on substantive due process grounds a municipal zoning ordi-
nance that placed the owner's parcel in a residential zone. The decision
suggested that the federal courts will act as super-boards of adjustment to
second-guess local districting decisions. What followed, however, was a
long period of time in which the Supreme Court refused to grant writs of
certiorari on appeals from state court zoning decisions, thus effectively
removing the Supreme Court from the zoning arena.
few counties limited power to zone by virtue of individual enabling acts that define the
geographic area to be covered. See e.g.., id. at § § 231.011-.023 authorizing two counties
to zone and plan on Padre Island.
22 0. Reynolds, note 7 supra at 111.
See e.g., Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (Md.App. 1925); Spann v.
City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (Tex. 1921). Eleven years after Spann, the
Texas Supreme Court reversed its position and upheld the general constitutionality of
zoning in Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934).
24 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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The "Typical" Zoning Bureaucracy
One of the impacts of the adoption of the SZEA by nearly all of the
states was the reasonably uniform way in which land use decisions were
made. That near-uniformity, however, has dissipated over time with
home rule and changing enabling legislation. Therefore, before one can
make any determination about how a zoning ordinance operates, one
must take care and review the relevant statutes, charter provisions and
ordinances. The legislative body is the only entity that can adopt a land
use or zoning ordinance. In addition to the adoption or amendment of
ordinances, legislative bodies increasingly participate in the final ap-
proval decision concerning discretionary permits or other administrative
decisions. 26 Typically, a zoning ordinance will create a citizen-staffed
commission sometimes called the Planning Commission, Zoning Com-
mission or Planning and Zoning Commission. This administrative body
is oftentimes delegated the power to develop the comprehensive plan and
to make decisions on subdivision plat applications. It also may have the
power to make recommendations regarding zoning ordinance amend-
ments. In larger substate units, the Commission will be supported by a
professional staff of planners. In addition, most substate units involved in
zoning will have another citizen-staffed agency known by a myriad of
terms including Board of Adjustment, Board of Zoning Appeals, Zoning
Board of Adjustment or Board of Appeals. The Board usually has the
power to grant variances and to hear appeals from orders or decisions
made by governmental officials working in the land use field.
The basic framework for zoning regulation comprises two main pil-
lars, use regulation and area or bulk regulation. From the onset, zoning's
major regulatory device was the creation of districts where only certain
uses were allowed. Historically, these use districts were cumulative or
"Euclidean" in nature, meaning that less intense development was al-
lowed in the more intense development districts. As an example, while a
multi-family dwelling could not be placed in a single-family residential
district, a single-family home could be placed in a multi-family residen-
tial district. As zoning and planning progressed, however, it is now
much more common for districts to be use-exclusive, meaning that only
those uses listed within a particular district are allowed. Within each use
district there will probably be two types of uses. The first category will
be those uses permitted as "of right" where the permit applicant is enti-
tled to build that type of use without further approval. The second cate-
gory encompasses discretionary permits whereby the permit applicant
will have to seek approval from either and administrative or legislative
body before the use will be allowed. These discretionary uses will be
26 Throughout this paper the term "discretionary permit" is used to describe what zoning
ordinances may call conditional use permits, special exceptions, special exception per-
mits, special uses or special use permits. The term, however, does not include variances.
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specifically listed by the zoning ordinance. It is not surprising that many
zoning ordinances treat oil and gas drilling and production facilities as
discretionary uses because they involve "negative externalities" espe-
cially when located in a populous area. In most circumstances the sub-
state unit will be authorized to grant these discretionary permits, grant
with conditions these discretionary permits or deny these permits. In
some jurisdictions, court decisions have begun to give these discretionary
permit uses greater protection than in the past, raising a presumption that
the discretionary use is allowed and placing the burden on the substate
unit to justify why the use should not be allowed in its specific location.27
Discretionary permits are to be distinguished from variances. Almost all,
if not all, zoning ordinances allow for the requirements of the ordinance,
be they use or bulk requirements, to be waived in cases where the appli-
cant can show unnecessary hardship or practical difficulties. Decisions
relating to variances are usually made by the Board of Adjustment with
direct appeal to the courts. Decisions relating to discretionary permits
may be made by the Planning Commission, Board of Adjustment or leg-
islative body and if made by the Commission or Board the legislative
body will often have the chance to review and/or approve the permit de-
cision. Finally, zoning ordinances, because they deal with an already-
built environment encompass the concept of a non-conforming use
(NCU). A NCU is a use in existence at the time that the zoning ordinance
or amendment is enacted that is normally allowed to continue, although
with some restrictions.
Oil and gas uses are treated as any other prospective use under a
zoning ordinance. The traditional rules relating to judicial review of zon-
ing decisions also apply. For example, in Wood v. City Planning Com-
mission,29 an oil and gas lessee sought a zoning ordinance amendment to
classify his land as being eligible for a drilling permit. The ordinance
authorized the city council to establish drilling districts after a review by
the planning commission. After the required review by the commission,
the council opted not to amend the ordinance. The oil and gas lessee ar-
gued that by following the procedural steps necessary to amend the ordi-
nance he was entitled to the amendment. A legislative body cannot be
mandated to amend an ordinance. Otherwise, any owner would be able to
demand an amendment by following the procedures set out in the zoning
ordinance. The line-drawing contest that is the essence of classical zon-
ing is a legislative function that should not be interfered with by the judi-
cial branch in the absence of some constitutional infirmity or a clear
abuse of discretion. The California court adopted the "Euclid" view that
if the legislative decision is merely "fairly debatable" it should be up-
" See generally, Daniel Mandelker, Land Use Law §§ 6.53-.56 (5* ed. 2003).
28 See Mandelker, Land Use Law supra note 27 at §§ 5.78-5.86.
29 130 Cal.App.2d 356, 279 P.2d 95 (1955).
- 204 -
7
Kramer: Local Land Use Regulation of Oil and Gas Development: Pumpjacks a
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2009
held.30 In many jurisdictions, courts have adopted the "soft glance" or
Euclid approach towards zoning decisions, although in recent decades
courts have tended to take a "hard look" at certain types of zoning deci-
sions, especially ones involving variances or discretionary permits.
What makes the zoning of oil and gas drilling operations unique is
the fact that unlike most uses you cannot drill for oil where it is not lo-
cated.3 1 Thus, if the reservoir is located in an area where drilling is not
allowed, it is likely that litigation will ensue. Several cases decided in the
middle of the 20t Century dealt with that problem. In Beveridge v.
Harper & Turner Oil Trust,32 an oil and gas lessee challenged the valid-
ity of the Oklahoma City zoning ordinance which placed its land in a
district where oil and gas drilling was totally prohibited. The proposed
drill site was located only 900 feet from the district boundary line and
only 600 feet from an area where mineral owners were entitled to share
in the proceeds from development within the oil and gas drilling district.
The court, however, refused to second guess the decision of the city to
draw the line where it did and thus provide a 300-foot buffer zone. The
court observed:
Fire hazard and danger alone is not the only effect that an oil filed
extension may have upon property. When the possible effects of oil
drilling extension are considered, one who seeks to foresee the ef-
fect thereof must consider oil derricks as possible substitutes for
shade trees in residence sections; slush pits as possible substitutes
for ornamental fishponds in the back yards; the rythmatic[sic] but
30 Particular states have the reputation of being "hard look" or "soft glance" jurisdic-
tions based on the amount of deference given to local land use decisions. For example,
Illinois has the earned reputation of being a "hard look" state. See La Salle National Bank
v. County of Cook, 12 Ill.2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957); but cf, Adkins v. City of West
Frankfort, 51 F.Supp. 532 (E.D.1ll. 1943Xlocal zoning and conservation ordinances are to
be upheld under the deferential "fairly debatable" test). Most other states take a "soft
glance" approach, giving substantial deference to local governmental zoning decisions.
See e.g., City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (1972), appeal dism'd 411
U.S. 901, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 977 (1972). There may be inconsistent views taken by
the same state court regarding the appropriate scope of judicial review. Even though Cali-
fornia is normally viewed as a state that rarely invalidates local land use regulations,
several California decisions apply a Nectow hard look approach to individual decisions
not to grant oil and gas drilling permits. See e.g., Sindell v. Smutz, 100 Cal.App.2d 10,
222 P.2d 903 (1950); Bernstein v. Smutz, 83 Cal.App.2d 108, 188 P.2d 48 (1947).
* With the advent of horizontal drilling techniques, among other technological ad-
vances, this statement is no longer as true as it was when many of these cases were de-
cided. Other mineral extractive activities run into the same problem. See generally, Bruce
M. Kramer, Local Land Use Regulation of Extractive Industries: Evolving Judicial and
Regulatory Approaches, 14 U.C.L.A. J. of Envt'l L. & Policy 41 (1996); Prohibiting or
Regulation Removal or Exploitation of Oil and Gas, Minerals, Soil or Other Natural
Products Within Municipal Limits, 10 A.L.R.3d 1226 (1966).
32 1934 OK 398, 168 Okla. 609, 35 P.2d 435 , overruled on other grounds, Oklahoma
City v. Harris, 1941 OK 331, 191 Okla. 125, 126 P.2d 988.
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somewhat harsh pulsation of a rotary drilling rig as a substitute for
the gentle sigh of balmy Oklahoma breezes passing through the fo-
liage of landscaped yards; the odor of escaping gases and flowing
crude oil as substitutes for the fragrance of residential rose gardens;
oil well appliances and machinery as competitors of the playground
apparatus usually provided for the neighborhood children; the rum-
ble of oil field trucks as a substitute for the tinkling bell of the ice
cream vendor; and the worry and apprehension that springs from the
knowledge of the increased fire hazard, be it great or small, as a
substitute for the feeling of security which permeates the household
removed from the oil field.
With these pungent words, the court chose to find the line drawing
done by the city sufficiently within the bounds of reason and not capable
of being disturbed. Yet the court still noted that the nature of the area so
restricted was already developed with residences and was likely to be the
subject of future development. The review of the nature of the surround-
ing neighborhood suggests a more intrusive scope of judicial review than
the prior excerpt connotes.3 4
In Clouser v. City of Norman,35 the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
visited the issue of drawing district boundary lines relating to oil and gas
well drilling operations. The City had annexed several tracts of land and
then zoned them for single-family residential (SFR) use. A second ordi-
nance prohibited the drilling of oil and gas wells in SFR districts. At the
same time as the city was prohibiting such drilling, the mineral owner
was leasing the land for development. A well was commenced by the
lessee. While applying a deferential scope of judicial review, the court
appeared to be second-guessing the city's choice of placing rural land
into a SFR district. The court reviewed the same factors discussed in
Harper & Turner, including existing population, proximity to existing
improvements and downplayed both the earlier court's emphasis on the
"negative externalities" of oil drilling and the need to plan for the future.
Thus, the city's restriction on oil and gas drilling was overturned as be-
ing arbitrary and unreasonable because it bore no relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare. Clouser reflects the Nectow
3 35 P.2d at 439. In accord, Anderson-Kerr, Inc. v. Van Meter, 1933 OK 156, 162
Okla. 176, 19 P.2d 1068, overruled on other grounds, Oklahoma City v. Harris, 1941 OK
331, 191 Okla. 125, 126 P.2d 988. (denial of variance to lessee to drill within buffer zone
upheld even though claim is made that oil will be drained to adjacent tract outside of the
no-drill buffer zone).
3 The language suggesting that the court would take a soft-glance approach to zoning
decisions was affirmed in Keaton v. Brown, 1935 OK 207, 171 Okla. 38, 45 P.2d 109
(1935) which upheld the rezoning of land so as not to allow oil and gas drilling opera-
tions as being within the sound discretion of the legislative body.
3s 1964 OK 109, 393 P.2d 827.
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"hard look" doctrine while Beveridge is clearly more consistent with the
Euclid "soft glance" doctrine.
In Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Larkins,36 the court was
faced with a request for a variance to allow the drilling of an oil well on a
parcel that did not meet the minimum well-spacing requirements of the
zoning ordinance. The parcel was located in a district that allowed oil or
gas wells. There was substantial oil and gas drilling operations in the
immediate vicinity of the proposed well. The Oklahoma City zoning or-
dinance authorized the board of adjustment to grant variances that were
not contrary to the public interest if the application of the ordinance
would cause an owner unnecessary hardship. The language of the ordi-
nance is typical for variance provisions. The board must weigh the harm
to the public versus the harm to the individual landowner. The board
voted not to grant the variance. In what can best be described as a "hard
look" review, the court, in a 4-to-3 decision overturned the board's deci-
sion. Without a variance, or the power to pool, the owner of the small
tract would lose its oil to the adjacent owners, creating the requisite un-
necessary hardship. This problem relating to the impact of the rule of
capture differentiates oil and gas variance requests with the more typical
surface use variance request. Notwithstanding, the potential loss of min-
erals, the dissent argued that the requirement that the public interest not
be harmed by the issuance of the variance had not been proven. The
minimum well spacing requirements serve an important public purpose
which should not be easily waived. According to the dissent the equities
did not lie with the small tract owner since most of the oil that would be
produced from a well on that tract would be drained from under the lands
of the adjacent owners.
An earlier Oklahoma Supreme Court decision, Van Meter v. West-
gate Oil Co.," set forth the following requirements before the Board may
issue a variance:
First, that the granting of such permit would not be contrary to pub-
lic interest; second, that the literal enforcement of the provisions of
the ordinances will result in unnecessary hardship; third, that by
granting the permit contrary to the provisions of the ordinance, that
"the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed"; fourth, that by grant-
ing of such permit "substantial justice be done."38
In Westgate Oil the court affirmed the denial of the variance while in
Indian Territory Illuminating, the court overturned the denial of the vari-
ance. There is little predictability in the area of how a court will review a
variance decision. This case illustrates that lack of predictability in de-
36 1934 OK 125, 168 Okla. 69, 31 P.2d 608.
3 1934 OK 287, 168 Okla. 200, 32 P.2d 719.
38 32 P.2d at 721.
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termining how a court will review a local land use variance decision.
While ostensibly applying a deferential role, courts often review de novo
these decisions trying to determine which side has the greater equities.
Another general land use principle that occasionally applies to oil
and gas land use decisions involves the concept of vested rights. This
concept is a subset of regulatory takings jurisprudence that will be dis-
cussed later in the paper. Vested rights basically involves the acquisition
of a protectible property interest in a project or development that can
only be changed or taken with the payment of compensation. Vested
rights operates on two levels, the first protects a vested rights owner from
having the legislative body change the "rules of the game" after the
vested right attaches. Thus, an oil and gas lessee with a drilling permit
issued by a city would not be subject to a zoning ordinance amendment
that no longer allowed drilling permits in the location where the lessee
has permission to drill. The second level recognizes that once a vested
right attaches, a property interest arises that receives the protection of the
Due Process and Just Compensation clauses of either the federal or state
constitution.
In Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara,39 the recipient
of a drilling permit issued in 1941 before the onset of World War II,
challenged the city's decision to revoke the permit after it enacted a zon-
ing ordinance amendment limiting drilling to industrial zoning districts.
The plaintiffs drilling permit covered lands located in a residential zone.
At the time the permit was issued, such drilling was authorized by the
ordinance then in effect. While normally a five-year delay in implement-
ing a drilling or building permit is too long, the court took into account
the many restrictions on oil and gas development that occurred after
World War II commenced. Revocations of permits must be reasonable
and cannot take place after the permit holder has expended substantial
sums in reliance of the permit's continued validity. Modem land use
practice usually imposes time limits on the effectiveness of various per-
mits, so the five-year hiatus between getting the permit and actually drill-
ing a well would probably not involve a vested right today. The court
allowed the lessee to drill in the residential location, further supporting
its decision by finding that there had been no residential development in
the area immediately surrounding the proposed well location that might
justify the permit being revoked because the well might constitute a pub-
lic nuisance.
Related to the concept of vested rights is the issue of non-
conforming uses (NCUs). As discussed earlier, a NCU is a use that ante-
dates the adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance, which under its
terms prohibits that use within the appropriate use, height or area regula-
39 85 Cal.App.2d 776, 194 P.2d 148 (1948).
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tions.4 While NCU issues raise certain constitutional questions, it is the
generally accepted view that in many states a NCU may be terminated if
a reasonable amortization period is given. 4' A good example of what
constitutes a NCU is the situation just discussed in Trans-Oceanic. The
oil and gas lessee with its permit to drill under the earlier ordinance can
drill and operate its oil and gas well even though such operations are now
prohibited in the zoning district under the later-amended ordinance. A
common issue with NCUs is whether they can be expanded or rebuilt.
Many zoning ordinances place severe restrictions on the ability of an
owner of a NCU to either expand or rebuild a NCU. In Beverly Oil Co. v.
City of Los Angeles,42 many of the NCU concepts were discussed. The
plaintiff owned and operated several oil and gas wells in an area that was
unincorporated at the time of the original drilling operations. After an-
nexation, the wells were placed in zoning districts where well drilling
was expressly prohibited. The ordinance, however, recognized the right
of NCUs to continue to operate. In 1946, the City amended its zoning
ordinance and expressly limited the right of oil and gas well NCUs to
drill additional wells or to deepen existing wells. Plaintiff challenged the
1946 ordinance that led to the issuance of a variance by the City permit-
ting the lessee to drill as many as four new wells, provided that for each
new well drilled, an existing well be plugged and abandoned. In 1949,
the zoning ordinance was further amended to provide for a five-year am-
ortization period for certain NCUs. The City interpreted the 1949
amendment, however, as not applying to plaintiffs oil and gas well pro-
duction operations. 43 The court denied the plaintiffs request for injunc-
tive relief to prevent the enforcement of the zoning ordinaGce on its oil
and gas operations. The limitation on the deepening of existing wells and
the prohibition against the drilling of new wells was treated as a reason-
able exercise of the police power. There was no unreasonable, oppressive
or unwarranted interference with property rights. Given the fact that the
City issued a variance to ameliorate the potentially harsh effects of the
NCU provisions of the ordinance, the court found that the ordinance, as
applied, was a valid exercise of the police power and would not be en-
joined.
40 See Mandelker, note 27 supra; Kramer, Local Land Use Regulation, note 31 supra
at 72-84.
41 A number of states, either by statute or common law decision, do not allow for
amortization of NCUs. See e.g., Minn.Stat.Ann. § 394.21; State v. Bates, 305 N.W.2d
426 (Iowa 1981); De Mull v. City of Lowell, 364 Mich. 247, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962).
42 40 Cal.2d 552, 254 P.2d 865, 2 O.&G.R. 477 (1953).
4 An amendment enacted after the litigation was instituted apparently did apply to oil
and gas wells and set a 20-year amortization period. The effect of that amendment was
not before the court.
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Oil and gas drilling and production operations are like any land use
that generate substantial "negative externalities." There is likely to be
public opposition to such uses, especially where there are nearby residen-
tial uses. Zoning ordinances will normally require such uses to get dis-
cretionary permits, giving neighborhood opposition a chance to voice
their opinion during the public hearing process. In addition, where resi-
dential development moves into rural or ex-urban areas that are already
dotted with oil and gas development, political pressure will undoubtedly
arise that will attempt to prohibit further development and restrict exist-
ing development. While NCU status will protect the extant operations,
the zoning ordinance may lawfully place restrictions, such was occurred
in Beverly Oil that will discourage oil and gas development and lead to
the possible premature abandonment of production activities.
Types of Zoning Regulation
From the beginning of municipal regulation of oil and gas drilling
operations, municipalities have regularly restricted such operations to
non-residential zones. The types of use districts where one can drill wells
is typically broader than for other industrial-type uses but nonetheless
there will be locational problems caused by use district regulation.
Almost all municipal regulations that I have seen borrow a regula-
tory device used for sexually oriented businesses, namely a minimum
setback requirement. In many circumstances there will be a minimum
distance requirement between the wellbore and a residence or inhabitable
dwelling or other specified use such as a school, hospital, religious insti-
tution or the like. Ordinances may have multiple setback requirements as
well so that distances between property lines and/or tank batteries may
also be covered. These distances may range from 300 to 1000 feet and
the better written ordinances will deal with measurement issues, includ-
ing whether dedicated rights of way are to be included or excluded from
the measurements. Changes to the setback requirement may involve a
discretionary use permit, a variance, or consent of the adjacent land-
owner. Obviously depending on which mechanism is used, the decision
may be made by the Planning and Zoning Commission, the Board of Ad-
justment or the local legislative body. In some jurisdictions there may be
a specially-created oil and gas administrative body that deals with both
permit and variance decisions.
Many zoning ordinances also regulate noise levels. The most typical
type of regulation sets a decibel limit at a specified distance from either
the property line or the wellbore. It is important that the ordinance spec-
ify how the distance is to be measured. The ordinances I have seen range
from a decibel limit of 70 to 90 at distances ranging from 300 to 500 feet.
The ordinance instead of setting a maximum decibel level may require
that the noise level not exceed the ambient noise level for the drillsite.
That would benefit drillsites located in areas where there are non-
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residential uses where the ambient noise level is likely to be higher than
the level found in residential areas. Again, the ordinance should spell out
how the ambient noise levels are to be determined since the overall noise
level will be set based on those ambient levels.
Because oil and gas drilling operations typically involve the move-
ment of heavy trucks and machinery over municipal streets, many mu-
nicipalities impose some type of road maintenance agreement or pay-
ment requirement. In some cases the ordinance requires the operator to
enter into a formal agreement with the municipality that will specify the
payments that the operator will need to make in order to use municipal
streets and may include a schedule for individual repairs, such as pot-
holes, that the operator will also have to reimburse the municipality for.
The agreement may also include a bond requirement, ranging anywhere
from $ 50,000 to $ 200,000 for road maintenance purposes. Some com-
munities do not require agreements, but do impose bond requirements.
Again due to the fact that most residents do not want to see a
pumpjack or drilling rig as they look out their home or car window,
many local ordinances contain landscaping and screening performance
standards. The most widespread requirement is that there be a solid or
masonry wall that surrounds the wells and tanks, typically at a height of
8 feet so as to block the drillsite from the public vista. Landscaping re-
quirements are also designed to create a buffer zone and, if the munici-
pality already has such requirements applicable to commercial and/or
industrial uses, those same requirements will be imposed upon oil and
gas operations. Each ordinance will differ as to the type of plant material
that may be used and the type of fencing that must be installed.
Other regulations that a municipality may apply to oil and gas op-
erations include prohibitions against salt water disposal wells inside city
limits. Some municipalities also regulate the disposal of produced water
and/or drilling mud by imposing a "closed-loop" system requirement,
rather than the more ubiquitous lined pit requirement required by state
conservation agencies. Closed-loop systems are quite a bit more expen-
sive than lined pits. Where lined pits are allowed, many municipalities
require that the pits be closed after drilling and the original contour of the
land be restored. Where municipalities have flood plains there may be
regulation ranging from a total prohibition against locating wells therein
to a system where a Corps of Engineers permit is required to one where a
well may be drilled only upon the receipt of a discretionary permit. Fi-
nally, because municipalities may impose regulatory fees to recover the
cost of implementing any regulatory program, it is likely that there will
be some type of permit fee imposed upon the operator. In the Barnett
Shale area, the permit fees range from a low of $ 1500/well to a high of $
9200/well. There need not be enabling authority allowing such fee ordi-
nances to be enacted because the power to impose such fees derives from
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the power to regulate. Given that limitation, however, the fees cannot be
a tax in disguise and must be reasonably related to the cost of regula-
tion."
III. The Preemption Problem
General Principles
As noted earlier, an initial issue that must be analyzed before one
can determine if a state statue preempts a substate ordinance is whether
the substate entity is a home rule or general law city. If the entity is a
general law entity, one must locate a statutory enabling act giving that
entity the power to regulate. If there is such an enabling act so that the
actions are not ultra vires, the issues are the same as one would ask when
a preemptible home rule unit is involved. If a nonpreemptible home rule
unit is involved, the first question that must be asked is whether the regu-
latory program is one concerning local or municipal affairs.
There are three basic preemption doctrines that generally apply in
the state/substate unit context. The first is express preemption. As noted
above, state preemption of local power is oftentimes not a politically pal-
atable idea. The second is implied preemption by conflict. The third is
implied preemption by occupation of the field.
The clearest form of state preemption occurs where the legislature
expressly preempts substate power. The now-repealed Ohio statute
quoted above is an example of an attempt at limited, but express preemp-
tion. The Louisiana statute is the clearest form of express preemption.45
Another occurred in Billy Oil Co., Inc. v. Board of County Commission-
ers,46 where the county sought to impose what it called a regulatory fee
on oil and gas drilling operations. A Kansas statute expressly preempted
county regulation of oil and gas drilling operations to the extent to which
those operations were within the regulatory powers granted the state
Corporation Commission.47 While there was some flexibility concerning
the extent to which the Corporation Commission regulated certain as-
4 0. Reynolds, note 7 supra at § 105.
45 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 30:28(F) provides in part: The issuance of a permit by the com-
missioner of conservation shall be sufficient authorization to the holder of the permit to
enter upon the property covered by the permit and to drill in search of minerals thereon.
No other agency or political subdivision of the state shall have the authority and they are
hereby expressly forbidden to prohibit or in any way interfere with the drilling of a well
or test well in search of minerals by the holder of such a permit.
4 240 Kan. 702, 732 P.2d 737, 91 O.&G.R. 470 (1987).
4 Kan.Stat.Ann. § 19-10la(22). This statute was amended while the outcome of the
litigation was pending to clarify the withdrawal of regulatory power from the counties
over the "production or drilling of any oil and gas well in any manner which would result
in the duplication of regulation by the state corporation commission." The subsection has
subsequently been renumbered. Kan.Stat.Ann., § 19-10la(21). A similar express preemp-
tion provision exists in Wyoming. Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 18-5-201.
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pects of the oil and gas drilling and production activities of the plaintiff,
there was no doubt that where there was overlapping or duplicative regu-
lation, state power would control." Express legislative statements re-
garding preemption, however, are the exception, not the rule. That leaves
the judiciary with the often difficult task of determining whether they
should find that there is an implied preemption of substate unit regula-
tory powers.
In dealing with implied preemption by conflict, an initial question
that adds another layer of complexity to the problem is the determination
of whether the state and substate powers actually conflict. Having dupli-
cative regulatory schemes does not necessarily create a conflict or incon-
sistency with state law. The approach taken by a court in defining what
constitutes a conflict may be critical. It is often stated that a conflict ex-
ists "where a local ordinance prohibits an act that a state statute permits,
or permits an act that the statue statute prohibits." 9 This aphorism, how-
ever, can quickly deteriorate into a semantic game.50
There can also be implied preemption by occupation of the field.
This approach requires the court to determine what the field is, and then
whether the state regulatory scheme is so pervasive, either in qualitative
or quantitative terms, so as to occupy the field. One might think that with
the extensive regulation of oil and gas exploration and production activi-
ties engaged in by state conservation agencies that most courts would
find that the field has been occupied. The results, however, are to the
contrary, as both Oklahoma and Texas courts have specifically found
that local zoning regulation of oil and gas operations is not preempted by
the state's occupation of the field.5 ' Because it involves judicial intrusion
into the relationship between states and substate units, many courts are
hesitant to find implied preemption by occupation of the field, although
in a number of states, such as California the doctrine is applied fre-
quently.
8 In accord, Dart Energy Corp. v. losco Township, 206 Mich.App. 311, 520 N.W.2d
652 (1994), where the court interpreted Mich.Comp.L. § 125.271 as expressly preempt-
ing the regulation of brine injection wells. See also Total Minatome Corp. v. Parish of
Caddo, 618 So.2d 1088, 126 O.&G.R. 258 (La.App. 1993), where the case involved a
dispute between the exercise of the parish's zoning power and the statutory power given
the Commissioner of Conservation. The reported decision only dealt with venue prob-
lems, not the preemption issue.
9 Reynolds, note 7 supra at 128.
5 Id. at 128-130.
s1 See e.g., Gant v. Oklahoma City, 1931 OK 241, 150 Okla. 86, 6 P.2d 1065, app.
dism 'd 284 U.S. 594 (1932), on subsequent appeal, 1932 OK 469, 160 Okla. 62, 15 P.2d
833, aff'd, 289 U.S. 98 (1933); Klepak v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 177 S.W.2d 215
(Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.). A North Dakota Attorney General's
opinion concluded that a county could not require the issuance of a well drilling permit,
notwithstanding a broad grant of power to regulate land use. N.D. Att'y Gen. Op. 90-23.
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California is a non-preemptible home rule state. 52 There is a state
conservation agency with somewhat limited powers when compared to
the major producing states.53 It also has a history of substate regulation of
oil and gas drilling activities that overlap with the state agency's power.
The state statute does not contain any express preemption language. In
the many cases dealing with local zoning regulations, the issue of pre-
emption has never arisen, the courts and/or parties presuming that local
governments have the concurrent power to regulate oil and gas drilling
and production activities.5 Thus, a total prohibition against the drilling
of wells in a residential zone was upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power.55
B. Colorado
Colorado is another non-preemptible home rule state. 6 But unlike
California, there has been active litigation in the state on the preemption
issue, both as it applies to home rule units and to non-home rule units.
Two cases illustrate the different approaches to the preemption problem
depending on whether a home rule or general law substate unit is in-
volved. The leading case dealing with a general law government is Board
of County Commissioners, La Plata County v. Bowen/Edwards Associ-
ates.57 The County adopted a zoning ordinance that restricted the location
of oil and gas drilling operations. The ordinance was authorized by a
state zoning enabling act for counties. In addition, Colorado has dele-
gated to the Oil and Gas Commission the traditional regulatory powers
over oil and gas drilling, production and exploration activities. The court
52 Calif. Const. art. IX, § 5(a).
s3 See Cal.Pub.Res. Code §§ 3300 et seq.
5 See e.g., Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9t Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 196 Cal.App.3d 223,
242 Cal.Rptr. 37, 97 O.&G.R. 504 (1987); Friel v. County of Los Angeles, 172
Cal.App.2d 142, 342 P.2d 374, 11 O.&G.R. 155 (1959); Bernstein v. Smutz, 83
Cal.App.2d 108, 188 P.2d 48 (1947).
ss See Friel v. County of Los Angeles, note 50 supra. The several instances where
California courts have struck down municipal ordinances deal with procedural and sub-
stantive due process and takings claims. See e.g., Pacific Palisades Association v. Hunt-
ington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 P. 538 (1925); Braly v. Board of Fire Commissioners,
157 Cal.App.2d 608, 321 P.2d 504 (1958); Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. Santa Barbara, 85
Cal.App.2d 776, 194 P.2d 148 (1948).
56 Colo. Const. art. IX, § 9.
s7 830 P.2d 1045, 118 O.&G.R. 417 (Colo. 1992). For a complete history of the ten-
sion between state and local regulation of oil and gas operations in Colorado, see Angela
Neese, The Battle Between the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and
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analyzed the three ways in which a general law government's expressly
delegated powers may be preempted by state statute. The first way is
through an express legislative statement that was not present in the Colo-
rado oil and gas conservation statute. The second methodology is the
occupation of the field theory.58 Occupation of the field analysis relies in
part on defiin the regulatory field as one involving state, state/local or
local interests.59 The third preemption methodology deals with the reality
of two complementary statutory schemes that can coexist as long as there
are no operational conflicts. The Bowen/Edwards court found no express
preemption and no occupation of the field. On the operational conflicts
issue, the court had to remand for further fact finding to determine if
there were such conflicts. The court noted that the County regulation was
not a total prohibition on locating oil and gas wells, but merely a re-
quirement that the producer get a county permit and comply with certain
performance standards before drilling a well.
The Bowen/Edwards approach to preemption was carefully fol-
lowed in Town of Frederick v. North American Resources Co.60 Freder-
ick, a non-home rule unit, enacted a comprehensive drilling ordinance
that required all parties to get a special use (discretionary) permit prior to
drilling within the Town. In addition, there was a $ 1000 application fee
and certain performance standards relating to well location, setbacks,
noise mitigation, visual impact and aesthetic impacts. The ordinance also
imposed penalties for failure to comply. NARCO drilled a well in the
Town without submitting a special use permit application, based upon its
receipt of a Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC)
permit.
The tri-partite approach to preemption analysis used in Bo-
wen/Edwards governed. While there have been changes in state statutes
and regulations dealing with the powers of the COGCC and non-home
rule units, the court found that they do not affect the application of Bo-
wen/Edwards. The court easily concluded that state statutes delegating
power to the COGCC did not contain any express preemption provision.
While there was some strengthening of COGCC's powers, the statutory
5 In an earlier case, the Colorado Court of Appeals had used the "occupation of the
field" theory to find a general law government's zoning ordinance inapplicable to an oil
and gas lessee. Obome v. County Commissioners of Douglas County, 764 P.2d 397, 102
O.&G.R. I (Colo.App. 1988), cert. denied, 778 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1989).
s9 Only four years prior to Bowen/Edwards, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that
a county regulation imposing substantial conditions on an oil and gas operator who had
received a state drilling permit was preempted under the occupation of the field theory.
Obome, note 54 supra. The conditions related to the need for a dirt berm for the sediment
ponds, a bond to cover the cost of reclamation and potential damages in the event of an
accident, a system of groundwater contamination prevention and cement casing. 764 P.2d
at 399.
6 60 P.3d 758, 157 O.&G.R. 716 (Colo.App. 2002, cert denied).
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changes merely expanded the area for potential operational conflicts and
did not contain language of express preemption. In fact, there was clear
statutory language showing that the Legislature intended that local regu-
lation of oil and gas operations continue. Likewise, the court found that
there should be no change in the Bowen/Edwards position that the Legis-
lature did not intend to impliedly preempt local control by the application
of the occupation of the field theory. While the COGCC has been given
greater power and has exercised that power through expanded regula-
tions, there was still no implied preemption by the occupation of the
field.
The court , however, did, find that in applying the "operational con-
flicts" test, several of the Town's regulations were preempted. The court
quoted from Bowen/Edwards to determine the scope and extent of these
operational conflicts. It said:
the efficient and equitable development and production of oil and
gas resources within the state requires uniform regulation of the
technical aspects of drilling, pumping, plugging, waste prevention,
safety precautions, and environmental restoration. Oil and gas pro-
duction is closely tied to well location with the result that the need
for unform regulation extends also to the location and spacing of
wells.61
The existence of a discretionary permit system per se, does not vio-
late the "operational conflicts" test of Bowen/Edwards, especially where
the Town provided that the permit cannot be denied when it met the per-
formance standards imposed by the ordinance. Thus, it was clear that
NARCO would have to file a permit application and pay the accompany-
ing fee in order to drill a well within the Town. The court also upheld
the Town's regulations insofar as they require building permits for
above-ground structures, access roads, response costs and similar items.
Those matters were found not to conflict with any extant COGCC regu-
lations. On the other hand, after doing a regulation-by-regulation analysis
of several other Town requirements, the court invalidated the Town's
setback requirements, noise abatement rules and visual impact rules as
directly conflicting with specific COGCC rules. In addition, the court
invalidated the Town's efforts to incorporate existing COGCC rules and
allow for independent Town enforcement. The court held that while
Colorado statutes allow any person to sue to enforce COGCC rules, that
person must comply with various procedural safeguards, none of which
were present in the Town's enforcement mechanism. Thus, the attempt to
have Town penalties for violating COGCC rules was also found pre-
empted by state law.
61 60 P.3d at 763 quoting from Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d at 1058.
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The "operational conflicts" test is necessarily an ad hoc approach to
determining whether there is state preemption. The COGCC sought to
provide some certainty to the test by promulgating a rule that provided:
"The permit-to-drill shall be binding with respect to any conflicting local
governmental permit or land use approval process." 62 In Board of County
Commissioners ofLa Plata County v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation
Commission, 63 several counties challenged the validity of the rule. As a
preliminary matter, the COGCC argued that the plaintiff counties lacked
standing to challenge the rule amendment. Colorado applied a two-part
test to determine standing. The plaintiff must first have suffered an injury
in fact and secondly, the injury must be to a legally protected interest as
contemplated by statutory or constitutional provisions. The court found
that counties have asserted an injury in fact because the COGCC rule
would strip them of their powers to regulate oil and gas drilling activi-
ties. No specific injury in fact needed to be shown because the counties
are asserting a facial attack on the validity of the rule. The legally pro-
tected interest was the counties' power to enact and enforce their land
use planning powers within their borders. Furthermore a specific statu-
tory grant to counties authorized them to seek judicial review of any
agency action which is directed to either a county or its employees." The
counties' had standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the ef-
fectiveness of the COGCC rule.
On the merits the court had to determine whether the amended rule
was consistent with the operational conflicts test. While normally the
interpretation of a rule by the a ency charged with its enforcement is
entitled to substantial deference, s this rule essentially involved an at-
tempt to codify the Bowen/Edwards test, a uniquely judicial function for
which no deference should be given. The rule provided that the COGCC
permit shall preempt "any conflicting" local land use regulation. Bo-
wen/Edwards only allowed preemption where there is an operational
conflict determined by the application of the ad hoc balancing test. Thus,
on its face the rule went too far in defining what local land use regula-
tions may be preempted and exceeded the COGCC's authority to prom-
ulgate rules.
The alleged preemption of a home rule unit's zoning ordinance was
analyzed in Voss v. Lundvall Brothers, Inc." The City ordinance totally
prohibited the drilling of oil and gas wells within city limits. The City
argued the ordinance was a matter affecting local or municipal affairs
62 COGCC Rule 303(a).
63 81 P.3d 1119, 158 O.&G.R. 216 (Colo.App. 2003, cert. denied).
" Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-4-106(4,5).
65 See Halverstadt v. Department of Corrections, 911 P.2d 654 (Colo.App. 1995).
6 830 P.2d 1061, 120 O.&G.R. 245 (Colo. 1992).
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and was therefore insulated from state statutory preemption under Colo-
rado's non-preemptible home rule provision. The State countered by ar-
guing that oil and gas drilling and production practices were matters of
statewide concern. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the oil and
gas conservation was a matter of both state and local concern. As a hy-
brid state/local matter, oil and gas conservation regulation may be exer-
cised by both the state and the home rule substate unit. The issue then
returned to the same arena as for the general law unit, was the ordinance
preempted. Because the ordinance involved a total prohibition, the court
found that there was an implied preemption by conflict. There is a sig-
nificant state interest in the efficient development and production of oil
and gas resources in a manner that prevents waste and protects correla-
tive rights. A total prohibition against drilling directly conflicted with
those goals by removing large areas of potential oil and gas production
from state control. That would frustrate the important state interests as
reflected in the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Therefore the
ordinance was preempted due to the operational conflict with the Act.
The difficulty in applying the Bowen/Edwards operational conflicts
test is reflected in Board of County Commissioners of Gunnison County
v. BDS International, LLCi 7 The County enacted an ordinance that regu-
lated oil and gas development by imposing various performance stan-
dards, bonding requirements and a permit fee. An operator, joined by the
Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission challenged the ordinance
on preemption grounds. The trial court found that much of the ordinance
was preempted under the operational conflicts test as a matter of law.
These regulations included permit submittal requirements relating to
wildlife and wildlife habitat analysis, vegetation, water quality and
drainage and erosion control plans. Further County regulations imposing
standards including waterbody setbacks, geological hazards, wildlife
hazards, financial guarantees and protection for cultural and historic re-
sources were also invalidated. The operator had not applied for a permit
so the attack seem to be facial in character.
Because it was a facial and not an as applied challenge, the court
attempted to harmonize the State and County regulatory programs so as
not to find preemption.68 The operational conflicts test necessarily re-
quires the court to take an ad hoc and "hard look" approach in reviewing
the ordinance and the state statute and regulations. In most situations,
summary judgment would be inappropriate in resolving an operational
conflicts claim. Notwithstanding the general rule regarding the need for
67 159 P.3d 773 (Colo.App. 2006, cert. denied).
68 A similar approach was taken in Colorado Mining Association v. Board of County
Commissioners of Summit County, 170 P.3d 749 (Colo.App. 2007), cert. granted, 2007
WL 3343001 (Colo. Nov. 13, 2007), rev'd, --- P.3d ---, 2009 WL 60506 (Colo. 2009).
See also California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
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an ad hoc balancing approach, the court did find that the County regula-
tions imposing financial requirements and providing access to records to
County employees were preempted because they were directly inconsis-
tent with COGCC regulations covering the same areas. As to the other
permit and performance standards, the Court of Appeals remanded the
case for a trial on the merits.69 Preemption in general, and operational
conflicts and occupation of the field theories in particular, necessarily
require courts to engage in balancing tests. Judicial balancing of public
policy interests, which are at the heart of many preemption claims not
only leads to inconsistent approaches but also to the judicial branch step-
ping into the shoes of the legislative branch. 7 0 This intrusiveness is not
necessarily to be blamed on an "activist" state court but on the Legisla-
ture's inability to clearly demarcate regulatory powers as between the
State and its substate units.
The Bowen/Edwards operational conflict approach to preemption
has been muddied somewhat in a recent decision of the Colorado Su-
preme Court dealing with the Mined Land Reclamation Act.7 1 In Colo-
rado Mining Association v. Board of County Commissioners of Summit
County,72 Summit County adopted an ordinance that effectively prohib-
ited certain types of mining techniques that involve the use of such
chemicals as cyanide to leach out precious metals, including gold. The
Act also regulated mining operations and techniques which regulates, but
does not prohibit the type of operations that Summit County bans. As
noted above Colorado has non-preemptible home rule power as to mat-
ters of local concern, but in both the mining and oil and gas areas the
matters are clearly not matters of local concern so that the analysis
should be the same presuming that the general law substate unit has been
given the authority to regulate.
The majority opinion treats the issue of whether a matter is of local
or state concern as a "preemption" analysis when it reality it is an ultra
vires analysis. The cites says that an implied preemption by conflict
analysis is guided by a four part test that looks to see whether there is a
69 To show the uncertainty of this ad hoc approach, the court remanded for a trial on
the merits the issue of whether certain local fire protection regulations were preempted,
even though it had found similar regulations preempted in Oborne v. Board of County
Commissioners, 764 P.2d 397, 102 O.&G.R. I (Colo.App. 1988), cert. denied, 778 P.2d
1370 (1989).
70 See 0. Reynolds, note 7 supra at §§ 38-44.
71 Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 34-32-101 et seq.
72 --- P.3d --- , 2009 WL 60506 (Colo. 2009).
7 Justice Martinez in a dissenting opinion accurately describes the paradox raised by
the majority opinion which first concludes that there has been an implied preemption by
occupation of the field, but then also finds that the County regulation is not a land use
regulation for which the County has clear authority to enact but is a reclamation regula-
tion for which there is express preemption. Id. at (Martinez, J. dissenting).
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need for statewide uniformity, whether the municipal regulation has an
extraterritorial impact, whether the subject matter is one traditionally
governed by state or local government and whether the Colorado Consti-
tution specifically commits the particular matter to state or local regula-
tion.74
C. Kansas
Kansas has a long history of substate unit regulation of oil and gas
drilling and production activities." The first major municipal regulatory
effort to deal with oil and fas activities in the United States occurred in
Winfield, Kansas in 1927. It involved spacing and pooling regulation
and served as a precursor to state regulatory efforts in those fields. As
noted earlier in the Billy Oil case, counties which have a form of legisla-
tive home rule power are expressly preempted from duplicating the regu-
lation imposed by the State Corporation Commission. Counties are ex-
pressly excluded from requiring operators from applying for licenses or
permits in order to drill and oil and gas well." Thus, the State has spoken
clearly in depriving counties of almost any power to regulate oil and gas
operations. No such limitation appears for cities, however, leaving them
open to regulate subject to the usual three-pronged preemption analysis
of express preemption, implied preemption by occupation of the field
and implied preemption by conflict. Those factors are relevant under
Colorado's non-preemptible home rule regime to determine whether the
state has any power to regulate in that area. If the matter is one of local
concern, the state has no power to act. If the matter is one of statewide
concern, or a mix of state and local concern that the issue should be re-
solved using traditional preemption analysis such as was utilized in Bo-
wen/Edwards.
The majority opinion also notes that preemption is more likely to be
found where the substate unit effectively prohibits something that the
state allows or regulates. The old local governmental maxim that a sub-
state unit may not forbid that which the state has explicitly authorized is
merely a restatement of the implied preemption by conflict dogma.
While further analyzing the Bowen/Edwards ad hoc operational conflicts
test, the court seems to be applying a per se conflict test where total pro-
hibitions are involved. The majority opinion, however, appears to be un-
74 Id. at - citing Voss v. Lundvall Bros, Inc., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992) and City
of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2003).
" One Kansas statute, enacted in 1907, authorized counties to appoint an "inspector
of natural gas, gas wells and gas pipe lines." American Bar Association, Legal History of
Conservation of Oil and Gas 41 (1938).
76 ABA History, note 71 supra at 55-56. See also Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d
541 (D.Kan. 1928), aff'd 32 F.2d 134 (8 Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 573 (1929).
" Kan.Stat.Ann. § 19-101a(21).
7 See Johnson v. Jefferson County Board of Health, 662 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1983).
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comfortable with the notion that a general law county's express grant of
power to regulate land use, a matter that is traditionally one of local con-
cern, has been totally preempted by the Act. It therefore attempts to bol-
ster its argument by accepting the argument made by the Mined Land
Reclamation Board that the County's regulation is really not a land use
standard but a reclamation standard for which there is an express statu-
tory preemption provision. It further roils the water by also suggesting
that something less than a total prohibition in terms of area might be an
acceptable land use regulation. In dissent, Justice Martinez points out the
inconsistency of a finding that an ordinance has been partially preempted
by a state statute. If the County has been delegated land use power by the
state, as it clearly has in this case, its choice not to allow a specific land
use anywhere in the County clearly falls within that grant of power. By
classifying the prohibition as a reclamation standard, however, the ma-
jority opinion leaves open to the County the possibility that it can now
prohibit mining in some zoning districts and allow it in others without
having its land use powers preempted.
D. Kentucky
In Blancett v. Montgomery,80an oil and gas lessee challenged a mu-
nicipal ordinance which restricted drilling within residential districts.
The lessee argued that its inability to drill was causing oil and gas to
drain to an adjacent well that was located outside of the city. The city
was a general law city that had the power to zone expressly granted it by
a state enabling act. The court found that the Kentucky Oil and Gas Con-
servation Act8 8did not preempt municipal zoning power. The issuance of
a state well drilling permit did not prevent the city from applying its zon-
ing ordinance to the proposed well location. There was no express pre-
emption and no implied preemption since the state statute did not evince
an intent to oust the city from exercising its zoning power.
E. Louisiana
Louisiana's preemption jurisdiction is both similar to, and different,
from the rest of the states. The 1974 Louisiana Constitution set up a bi-
7 A concurring opinion finds that as to general law substate units the issue is not
preemption but a matter of statutory interpretation. The concurring justices conclude that
as to reclamation standards the State has not that power to counties. I disagree with the
notion that an ordinance prohibiting a specific use contained within the County's zoning
ordinance is a "reclamation" standard rather than a land use standard. Id. at _. (Eid, J.
concurring). The concurring opinion ignores the fact that the Legislature has granted to
the state agency certain powers and granted to general law counties other powers without
resolving the dispute except as to reclamation standards. The preemption analysis should
be the same for matters of statewide concern whether it involves a home rule unit or a
general law unit that has been granted the power to regulate.
s 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.App. 1966).
81 Ky.Rev.Stat. §§ 353.500 et seq.
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furcated system by which pre-1974 home rule substate units are treated
differently than post-1974 home rule units. 82 The post-1974 home rule
substate units are given broad home rule powers that are "not denied by
general law or inconsistent with this constitution."83 But notwithstanding
that broad constitutional grant of power, there is another constitutional
provision that provides, somewhat inconsistently, that "the police power
of the state shall never be abridged."" Prior to the adoption of the 1974
Constitution, it was commonplace for courts to invalidate substate ,olice
power regulations under an implied preemption by conflict theory. C The
courts, however, seemed to make an exception from the presumptive
preemption rule for matters relating to local taxation.86
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, in its pronouncements in
the past 20 years has taken positions more consistent with the views es-
poused in most states relating to state preemption of substate unit police
power. The court described the following preemption analysis:
Local power is not preempted unless it was the clear and manifest
purpose of the legislature to do so, or the exercise of dual authority
is repugnant to a legislative objective: if there is no express provi-
sion mandating preemption, the courts will determine the legislative
intent by examining the pervasiveness of the state regulatory
scheme, the need for state uniformity, and the danger of conflict be-
tween the enforcement of local laws and the administration of the
state program.8 7
This language appears to embrace the traditional notions of state preemp-
tion although the issue of state uniformity can be used in both the im-
plied occupation of the field theory and the analysis of whether a particu-
lar subject matter is a matter of local or state concern.
When it comes to express statements of state preemption relating to
oil and gas regulatory matters, Louisiana is the one state with the clearest
and most wide-ranging preemption language. Its statute provides:
82 La. Const. art. VI, § 5. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, 64
La.L.Rev. 275, 279 (2004)
83 Id., art. VI, § 5(E).
8 Id., art. VI, § 9(B).
8 See Savage v. Prator, 921 So.2d 51, 54-55 (La. 2006).
86 See Walker, City of Baton Rouge v. Williams: The Louisiana Supreme Court Ex-
pands Home Rule Police Power, 70 Tulane L.Rev. 1751 (1996)
87 Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Commission of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So.2d
482, 497 (La. 1990), citing Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So.2d 1218, 1227
(La. 1989). There is some contrary language that harkens back to the "creature" theory of
local governments in Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. lberville Par-
ish Police Jury, 371 So.2d 1127 (La. 1979) that in my opinion has been overruled sub
silentio by Palermo Land, op cit. and Savage v. Prator, note 85 supra.
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The issuance of a permit by the commissioner of conservation shall
be sufficient authorization to the holder of the permit to enter upon
the property covered by the permit and to drill in search of minerals
thereon. No other agency or political subdivision of the state shall
have the authority and they are hereby expressly forbidden to pro-
hibit or in any way interfere with the drilling of a well or test well in
search of minerals by the holder of such a permit.8 8
On its face the statutory language would clearly prevent a substate
unit from prohibiting or interfering with a oil and gas operator who pos-
sesses a state permit to drill. There is, however, some wiggle room in the
language to suggest that a substate unit might be able to regulate oil and
gas operations, especially the surface externalities, so long as it neither
prohibited nor interfered with the operator. For example could a parish or
municipality impose a road use agreement requirement on an oil and gas
operator or a screening easement/fencing requirement as do many sub-
state units that regulate oil and gas operations. Likewise could they im-
pose a noise restriction at the property line in areas where the oil and gas
drilling operation is within a designated distance of a residence, school or
business? These are unanswered questions that recent Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions suggest cannot be simply decided in favor of state pre-
emption.
Notwithstanding this express preemption language relating to sub-
state unit prohibitions, the City of Shreveport attempted to prohibit drill-
ing within 1,000 feet of a city-owned lake that served as its drinking wa-
ter supply. The City had gained title to the lake from the State, but the
State reserved the minerals underlying the lake. The City had express
authority to regulate the lake and the surrounding land for the purposes
of protecting the drinking water supply. In Energy Management Corp. v.
City of Shreveport,89 the state's lessee challenged the City's power to
prohibit its exploration for, and production of, State minerals located be-
neath the lake. In this federal litigation the court noted that in recent
times Louisiana generally follows the tri-partite view of preemption
looking at express preemption, implied preemption by occupation of the
field and implied preemption by conflict. This case should have applied a
simple express preemption analysis. The state statute clearly preempted
local prohibitions against a party with a state permit to drill from exercis-
ing its right to drill. A 1000 foot no-drill zone, as imposed by the City,
would prohibit EMC from drilling where the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion said it could drill. Instead of relying solely on the express statutory
preemption language the Fifth Circuit spoke in terms of the need for uni-
U La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 30:28(F). An earlier version of this statute was the subject of an
Attorney-General's opinion concluding that substate units were preempted from regulat-
ing oil and gas operators. Attorney General Opinion No. 82-1021 (Oct. 22, 1982).
89 397 F.3d 297, 161 O.&G.R. 963 (5th Cir. 2005).
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formity in state regulation, a policy properly used in implied preemption
by occupation of the field situations. The court also noted that state
regulation of oil and gas operations are "clearly pervasive addressing
every phase of the oil and gas exploration process from exploration and
prospecting to cleanup of abandoned oilfield waste sites." ' The perva-
siveness or lack thereof is irrelevant given the express statutory lan-
guage. While other state statutes dealing with conservation agencies have
similar regulatory schemes, the Fifth Circuit appears to be about the only
court that has suggested that the field of oil and gas regulation has been
occupied by the state. As noted above, the state conservation agency is
typically charged with dealing with matters relating to prevention of
waste, protection of correlative rights and conservation of natural re-
sources and not surface externalilties, environmental and otherwise, that
oil and gas drilling and production operations entail.
The City argued that its home rule status provided it with insulation
from state preemption. The court noted that home rule status does pro-
vide the substate unit with all of the powers of the state subject to consti-
tutional and statutory limitations, but that the City's home rule charter
only gave it such powers as relates to the territorial boundaries of the
City. The lake was outside of those boundaries, even though the surface
was owned by the City. Again the court should have simply stated that
home rule powers may be expressly preempted by the State under the
Louisiana constitutional provision that reserves all police power to the
State.
Upon remand to the District Court, the Court only invalidated the
City ordinance insofar as it regulated lands within 1000 feet of the lake.92
The Fifth Circuit, however, set the record straight by finding that the en-
tire ordinance was preempted.9 3 The City argued that the other provisions
in the ordinance which related to such matters as minimum casing re-
quirements, insurance requirements, plugging and abandonment re-
quirements, well location diagram requirements and drilling fluid pro-
gram approval requirements were not invalidated by the earlier decision.
While a number of those provisions appear to deal with matters regulated
by the state, others do not and overall these provisions do not necessarily
lead to a prohibition against drilling. Relying on language from the ear-
lier opinion that dealt with implied preemption the Fifth Circuit re-
affirmed its earlier conclusion that any substate regulation of drilling op-
9 397 F.3d at 303-04.
91 397 F.3d at 303.
92 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 80925 (W.D.La. Nov. 6, 2006). See also Holland v. Questar
Exploration & Production Co., 2006 U.S.Dist LEXIS 9492 (W.D.La.).
93 Energy Management Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471, 169 O.&G.R. 716
(5 Cir. 2006). The court, however, did not award EMC any damages even though it
apparently lost its lease during the litigation.
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erations and/or activities was impliedly preempted by the state's occupa-
tion of the field.94 There is a difference between prohibition and regula-
tion that the court's opinion blurs. While citing the Louisiana Supreme
Court's recent jurisprudence that creates a presumption against finding
state preemption, the Fifth Circuit takes the older view that the occupa-
tion of the field doctrine should apply with a very expansive definition of
what is the field that has been occupied.
F. Michigan
Michigan used to have an express preemption provision for general
law townships that prohibited them from regulating or controlling the
drilling, completion, or operation of oil or gas wells.' In 2006, that pro-
vision was repealed and re-enacted to cover both townships and coun-
ties.9 As with Louisiana, the preemption language is quite broad and
general in nature. The statute provides:
A county or township shall not regulate or control the drilling, com-
pletion, or operation of oil or gas wells or other wells drilled for oil
or gas exploration purposes and shall not have jurisdiction with ref-
erence to the issuance of permits for the location, drilling, comple-
tion, operation or abandonment of such wells.9 7
Notwithstanding the express preemption of the earlier statutory pro-
vision, a Michigan court utilized an occupation of the field theory to
deny a township the power to regulate the conversion of an oil and gas
well to a brine injection well.98 In fact as analyzed by the court, the issue
really wasn't a preemption issue but an ultra vires issue because the stat-
ute excepted from the grant of zoning enabling authority, the authority to
regulate oil and gas wells. "Under the new statute, no county or town-
9 The court relied on Greater new Orleans Expressway Commission v. Traver Oil
Co., 494 So.2d 1204 (La.App. 1986) and the Louisiana Attorney General's opinion. La.
Op. Att'y Gen. 88-418 (1988)
9s Mich.Comp.L. § 125.171(1), repealed by Pub. Acts 2006, No. 110, Art. II, § 205
and replaced with Mich.Comp.L. § 125.3205.
% Mich.Comp.L. § 125.3205.
9 Id.
* Dart Energy Corp. v. losco Township, 206 Mich.App. 311, 520 N.W.2d 652
(1994). See also Addison Township v. Gout, 435 Mich. 809, 460 N.W.2d 215 (1990).
New York has an express preemption provision in its oil and gas conservation laws. See
N.Y. Env.Cons.L. § 23-0303(2). In Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, 112 Misc.2d
432, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup.Ct.), af'd 89 A.D.2d 1056, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1982), app.
denied, 58 N.Y.2d 602, 458 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 444 N.E.2d 1013 (1983), the court invali-
dated an attempt to get around the preemption language by tying the regulation to mu-
nicipal streets, the one area where local regulation is not expressly preempted. Prior to the
enactment of the statute local regulation was allowed. Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of West-
field, 82 A.D.2d 117,442 N.Y.S.2d 290, 70 O.&G.R. 34 (1981).
" Prior to the statutory amendment expanding the preemption coverage to counties,
the court applied traditional ultra vires doctrine to deny a county the power to regulate
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ship in Michigan has any power to regulate oil and gas operations even
though they have the authority to engage in zoning and other land use
controls by virtue of various state enabling acts.
G. North Dakota
While North Dakota, in general, has not adopted home rule as the
prevailing source of power for its substate units, it does give counties
extensive powers to zone and otherwise engage in land use regulation.'*
There are no reported judicial opinions regarding conflicts between the
Industrial Commission's authority and County zoning authority. In 1990
an opinion by the Attorney-General concluded that while a close ques-
tion, the state had occupied the field of regulating oil and gas operations
preempting County regulation.' 0 Yet shortly thereafter that same Attor-
ney-General hedged his bets when he responded to an inquiry by a
County official regarding such regulation. The letter stated in part:
Attorney General Opinion 90-23 stated that a county could not regu-
late the production of oil and issue drilling permits as this function
was specifically delegated to the Industrial Commission. However,
if the county does not attempt to intrude into the Industrial Commis-
sion's jurisdiction over the business of oil production, instead mak-
ing decisions regarding use permits based upon land use considera-
tions, the laws will be compatible. 0 2
This clarification makes it difficult to determine the scope and extent of
county power to regulate in ways that do not deal with the issuance of
permits or regulation of production. Bonding requirements, environ-
mental requirements, road requirements, noise regulation and landscap-
ing requirements all might fit under the rubric of land use, not oil and
gas, regulation.
some aspects of oil and gas drilling activities. County of Alcona v. Wolverine Environ-
mental Production, Inc., 233 Mich.App. 238, 590 N.W.2d 586 (1998). In Wolverine, the
County attempted to require an oil and gas operator who had a drilling permit to apply for
a soil erosion permit and be subject to other performance standards. The Court of Ap-
peals determined that even though the County had authority to implement state environ-
mental standards, it did not have authority to require soil erosion permits.
'" N.D.Cent. Code H 11-33-01 et seq.
101 Attorney General Opinion 90-23 (October 5, 1990).
102 Letter from Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General to Steven Wild, Bowman County
State's Attorney dated December 16, 1991, reproduced in Perry Pearce, The Spectrum of
Choices: Formulation and Implementation of Regulatory Land Use Decisions Affecting
Mineral Development, Rocky Mtn. Min.L.Fdn. Special Institute on Mineral Development
and Land Use Law (May 1995).
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H. Ohio
While Ohio used to have an express preemption statute,10 3 the scope
of the preemption of local zoning regulation under that statute created the
same type of problems as does the judicial doctrine of operational con-
flicts that is applied in Colorado. In Newbury Township Board of Trus-
tees v. Lomak Petroleum (Ohio), Inc.,10 the Supreme Court attempted to
draw the line between allowed local regulation for health and safety and
disallowed regulation of well spacing and location. The Township zoning
ordinance prohibited cdilling in most residential zones, required a mini-
mum setback from streets and highways and a 300-foot setback from
inhabited structures. The court applied a balancing test by looking at the
individual application of the ordinance to the proposed drilling opera-
tions. The court noted that much of the Township was rural in character,
yet the largely uninhabited areas currently being used in agricultural pur-
suits were zoned for residential development. This had the effect of pre-
cluding almost all oil and gas drilling operations within the Township.
Thus, the Township had effectively vetoed the state's choice for drill
sites by limiting the areas where wells could be drilled. The court also
found that the Township setback requirements were not preempted even
though the state had adopted its own setback requirements that were less
stringent. The court labeled the Township's standards as involving health
and safety concerns, thus not coming under the express preemption lan-
guage. In response to Newbury Township, the legislature amended the
statutory preemption provision to make sure that setback requirements
from buildings would be a matter preempted by the state. os In 2004, the
Legislature repealed the preemption provision, presumably returning to
substate units their traditional land use powers over oil and gas opera-
tions.
I. Oklahoma
Oklahoma, like Ohio, has had some difficulty in defining the scope
and extent of preemption, although in Oklahoma no express statutory
preemption language exists. In Gant v. Oklahoma City, 0 oil and gas
operators sought an injunction to prevent the city from enforcing its or-
dinance requiring a $ 200,000 bond for each well drilled within city lim-
its. The city also sought injunctive relief to prevent the operators from
drilling wells until such time as the bonding requirements were satisfied.
1o3 Ohio Rev.Code § 1509.39 repealed by 2004 H 278. A more clearly worded express
preemption provision covers the regulation of mineral extraction operations by counties
in Wyoming. Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 18-5-201.
104 62 Ohio St.3d 387, 583 N.E.2d 302, 117 O.&G.R. 107 (1992).
1os St. Croix, Ltd. v. Bath Township, 118 Ohio App.3d 438, 693 N.E.2d 297, 139
O.&G.R. 363 (Ohio App. 1997).
106 1931 OK 241, 150 Okla. 86, 6 P.2d 1065, app. dism'd 284 U.S. 594 (1932) , on
subsequent appeal, 1932 OK 469, 160 Okla. 2, 15 P.2d 833 , ajfd, 289 U.S. 98 (1933).
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The operators argued that the Corporation Commission regulated oil and
gas drilling operations, including the setting of minimum bonding re-
quirements. Those state statutes and Commission regulations preempted
the city's ordinance according to the operators. The court reviewed sev-
eral early preemption cases and concluded:
[The cases do] not disclose anything in them, that would warrant us
in holding that the general police power of Oklahoma City to pro-
vide for the safety and health of its inhabitants, is in any way taken
away by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred upon the corporation
commission, to superintend the drilling for oil and gas. 07
Without express language, the court was not going to presume implied
preemption of the local police power. The court was concerned with the
safety threat to the citizens of Oklahoma City created by the presence of
substantial numbers of oil wells, located in close proximity to residences.
Gant follows the traditional view that implied preemption is not to
be easily found. Instead, concurrent regulation, especially in the absence
of operational conflicts, is to be tolerated. Nonetheless, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court three years after Gant decided that a local regulation was
preempted. In Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Larkins,08 the
court faced a challenge to a municipal decision not to grant a variance to
the minimum well-spacing requirements of the city zoning ordinance.
Instead of labeling the well-spacing requirement as a health and safety
issue, which it easily could have given the Gant opinion stressing the
problems of dense development in residential districts, the court instead
labeled this type of regulation, a prevention of waste regulation. The
court distinguished Gant by stating:
We want to emphasize the fact ... that the Legislature, in delegating
to certain cities the power to restrict the drilling of wells within the
boundaries thereof, was dealing with the police power insofar only
as the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the public might
be injuriously affected by such drilling. The Legislature did not con-
fer authority upon cities to prevent the commission of waste of natu-
ral resources or to prevent the inequitable taking of oil from a com-
mon source of supply. Such authority was delegated by other statu-
tory provisions to another tribunal.'
Thus the key is to place the municipal regulation in its appropriate
cubbyhole, a cubbyhole that is different than the state's cubbyhole. Well
107 6 P.2d at 1068. The court in C.C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. City of Oklahoma
City, 1934 OK 88, 167 Okla. 384, 29 P.2d 952, 955 said: "The delegation of power to the
corporation commission did not operate to deprive the Legislature of power to delegate to
cities the power [to regulate oil and gas operations]."
08 1934 OK 185, 168 Okla. 69, 31 P.2d 608.
109 31 P.2d at 611.
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spacing is just as relevant to the public safety as bonding requirements,
yet the court refused to treat them as the functional equivalent of each
other.
J. Pennsylvania
The Oklahoma approach which emphasizes that substate regulation
will only be preempted where it intrudes into matters relating to the
statewide regulation of oil and gas operations in order to prevent waste
and to conserve natural resources appears to be followed in Pennsyl-
vania. Pennsylvania's Oil and Gas Act contains an express preemption
provision that s*ates:
Except with respect to ordinances adopted pursuant . . . [to the
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code and Flood Plain Man-
agement Act], all ordinances and enactments purporting to regulate
oil and gas well operations regulated by this act are hereby super-
seded. No ordinances or enactments adopted pursuant to the afore-
mentioned acts shall contain provisions which imposed conditions,
requirements or limitations on the same features of oil and gas well
operations regulated by this act or accomplish the same purposes as
set forth in this act. The Commonwealth, by this act, hereby pre-
empts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas wells as herein
defined."o
While the first sentence provides a large exemption from preemp-
tion, the second and third sentences, which were added in 1992, greatly
narrow that exemption and require the court to examine what regulations
deal with the same features as does the state statute. Prior to the addition
of the second and third sentences, the Pennsylvania courts noted that
widespread exemption from preemption for local zoning ordinances
adopted pursuant to the MPC. That was the conclusion of the court in
Nalbone v. Borough of Youngsville,' which found that a local zoning
ordinance could be applied to oil and gas operations since the ordinance
was adopted pursuant to the zoning enabling act and was not a general
police power regulation that would be preempted. So long as the zoning
regulation was adopted for the purpose of land use under the pre-1992
statute, it could be enforced.
With the addition of the "features" language of the second and third
sentences, however, courts now have to examine ordinances on a case-
by-case basis to determine whether they have been preempted. In Com-
monwealth v. Whiteford,H2 the owner of a mineral estate challenged the
municipality's authority to issue a cease and desist order preventing him
11o 68 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 601.602.
" 104 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 522 A.2d 1173 (1987).
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from engaging in further activities in drilling an oil and gas well and fin-
ing him for violating various provisions of the municipality's zoning or-
dinance. The court found that the purposes served by the Oil and Gas Act
did not fall within the purposes served by the local regulation. The mu-
nicipality argued that the owner's actions affected nearby roadways and
that his failure to apply for a surface grading permit violated the ordi-
nance. The court agreed with the municipality that both roadways and
surface disturbing activities were matters covered by the zoning ordi-
nance and not part of the Commonwealth's purposes in regulating oil and
gas operations.
In Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Borough of Oak-
mont,113 the Borough was not allowing an oil and gas lessee to drill a
well in a residential zoning district. The Council had determined that
natural gas is not a "mineral" within the terms of the ordinance and thus
did not qualify for a discretionary permit for mineral extraction activities.
The Council also determined that the purposes of the drilling operation
would be commercial in nature and thus totally prohibited from a resi-
dential zoning district. Finally, the Council determined that its ordinance
was not preempted. The Commonwealth Court disagreed with the con-
clusion that natural gas extraction is not authorized as a discretionary use
because natural gas is a mineral for purposes of the ordinance. In then
analyzing the preemption claim, the court noted that the state statute spe-
cifically deals with location criteria through the state permit system.
There are no restrictions on drilling a well other than it cannot be within
200 feet of an existing building or water well. The proposed well loca-
tion met that criteria and under the terms of the statute, the ordinance was
regulating the same feature, location, as did the state statute. Thus, as to
the ordinance prohibition against placing wells in residential districts, the
ordinance was preempted. As to the other aspects of the zoning ordi-
nance, the court remanded the case back to the trial court for the kind of
ad hoc determination that must be made to see whether there is preemp-
tion.
In Great Lakes Energy Partnership v. Salem Township,1 l4 the re-
quirement that substate regulation of oil and gas operations takes place
within the context of the enabling act was made clear. The Township
enacted an ordinance regulating surface and land development associated
with oil and gas drilling operations. The ordinance was immediately
challenged as not falling with the statutory exception for preemption.
The Township then enacted a comprehensive subdivision and land de-
velopment ordinance that included the provisions of the earlier, and now-
repealed oil and gas land use regulations. Instead of engaging in a regula-
" 929 A.2d 1252 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007).
" 931 A.2d 101 (Pa.Cmwith. 2007).
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tion-by-regulation analysis, akin to the Colorado operational conflicts
approach, the Commonwealth Court merely affirmed the decision of the
trial court invalidating all of the regulations impacting oil and gas opera-
tions. Under the terms of the statute there must be some local regulation
that is allowed, as was shown in the Whiteford and Huntley decisions.
Great Lakes, while relying on the trial court opinion, appears to ignore
the limited preemption authorized by the statute that only invalidates
substate regulation interfering with the "features" of the state regulatory
scheme.
K. Texas
While the Railroad Commission of Texas has been delegated sub-
stantial authority to regulate the oil and gas industry, local regulation of
oil and gas drilling and production activities has been widespread since
the 1930s." 5 Early municipal regulation was more than zoning or land
use in nature, and oftentimes involved compulsory pooling by requiring
the creation of drilling blocks within the municipality where only a sin-
gle well could be drilled."' 6 Texas also gives home rule status to most
larger cities and in recent years has given broad police power powers to
general law cities. Counties, on the other hand, possess minimal police
power regulation and no power to zone with few exceptions. In the only
frontal attack on a substate unit's zoning and conservation ordinance
based on preemption, the court easily dismissed the operators arguments
and observed:
However, it is held that the Legislature-in so delegating that au-
thority [oil and gas conservation] to the Railroad Commission--did
not thereby intend to nor accomplish the repeal of the fundamental
law theretofore, as well as subsequently, existing, that municipali-
ties in Texas have, under the police power, authority to regulate the
drilling for and production of oil and gas within their corporate lim-
its, when acting for the protection of their citizens and the property
within their limits, looking to the preservation of good government,
peace, and order therein." 7
A recent decision, City of Mont Belvieu v. Enterprise Products Op-
erating, L.P.,' '8reinforces the basic doctrine that even though there is
1s See e.g., Tysco Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 12 F.Supp. 195
(S.D.Tex. 1935)(City of South Houston sued as a defendant after adopting a zoning ordi-
nance restricting the density and location of wells).
116 See Scott Lansdown, Municipal Ordinances That Compel or Encourage the Pool-
ing or Unitization of Oil and Gas Interests, 14 State Bar of Texas Oil, Gas and Mineral
Law Section Report 1(1989).
" Klepak v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 177 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex.Civ.App.-
Galveston 1944, writ refd w.o.m.). In accord Unger v. State 629 S.W.2d 811
(Tex.App.-Ft. Worth 1982, writ refd).
" 222 S.W.3d 515 (Tex.App.-Houston [ 14 th Dist.] 2007).
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extensive state regulation over various aspects of the oil and gas industry,
there is no preemption of municipal regulation. Enterprise received a
permit from the Railroad Commission in order to drill a well to operate
and maintain an underground hydrocarbon storage facility in a salt dome.
It already had a permit to operate the storage facility. After participating
in the Railroad Commission hearings on the permit, the City did not ap-
peal the permit decision. It did, however, file suit against Enterprise for
failing to apply for a City permit to drill the injection well. The Court
clearly found that the Legislature did not intend to give the Railroad
Commission exclusive jurisdiction over hydrocarbon storage facilities. It
remanded the case to determine if there was implied preemption by con-
flict as to any of the specific City regulatory requirements.
IV. Federal Preemption of Substate Unit Regulation
It is beyond the scope of this paper to anal ze the issue of federal
preemption of state conservation agency powers. 1 In recent years, how-
ever, there have been a number of cases where substate unit regulation
has run afoul of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
As noted earlier, while the federal preemption doctrine is mandated by
the Constitution, the parameters of the tests relating to federal preemp-
tion are almost identical to the tests applied in the state/local preemption
scenario. There are three ways in which the Federal Government may
preempt state or local powers: express preemption, implied preemption
by occupation of the field and implied preemption by conflict. 20 Federal
courts more explicitly recognize that preemption, es ecially implied pre-
emption is a matter of discerning legislative intent.' 1 Also analogous to
state/local preemption is the presumption in favor of local regulation, in
the federal context requiring a "clear and manifest" intent to preempt the
historic police powers reserved to the states. 122
Exercise of substate unit police powers are most readily preempted
when the matters relate to powers exercised by the Federal Government
pursuant to the Natural Gas Act. 123 For example, in AES Sparrows Point
LNG, LLC v. Smith,124 a Maryland county amends its zoning ordinance
1l9 The issues are explored in Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick H. Martin, The Law of
Pooling and Unitization § 24.04 (3d ed. 2009).
120 See e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 103 O.&G.R. 56
(1988); Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific RR Co., 534 F.3d 443 (5, Cir. 2008).
121 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
122 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resource Conservation & Development
Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
123 See Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Board, 474 U.S. 409
(1986); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., note 120 supra.
124 470 F.Supp.2d 586, 165 O.&G.R. 287 (D.Md. 2007). For other recent cases follow-
ing the Schneidewind view that the NGA occupies the field as it relates to the wholesale
sales and transmission of natural gas see Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Munns, 254
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that places limits on the location of LNG facilities in response to AES'
application before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity. As noted above, preemp-
tion under the Natural Gas Act has been found on numerous occasions.
The NGA, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct)125 at-
tempts to streamline the energy facility siting process relating to LNG
facilities. The district court, in a case of judicial overkill, finds that the
NGA as amended by EPAct, expressly preempts County regulation of
LNG siting decisions, impliedly preempts by occupation of the field re-
lating to LNG siting decisions and impliedly preempts by conflict the
County decision not to allow an LNG facility to be located where the
FERC has authorized its siting.'
Where other federal statutes are involved, however, the results are
more mixed when it comes to finding federal preemption. In Algonquin
LNG v. Loqa,12 7 Algonquin operates an LNG facility in a zoning district
where such uses are not allowed. The LNG facility is a valid noncon-
forming use which under traditional zoning doctrine may not be ex-
panded. It seeks a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate of
public convenience and necessity to modify and expand its facility. The
FERC issues the certificate but the City refuses to issue a building permit
because it would violate its zoning ordinance. The key statute is the
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act.' 28 There are express preemption provi-
sions that prohibit states from adopting or enforcing safety standards of
interstate pipelines and for intrastate pipelines unless the state authority
has been certified by the United States Department of Transportation. 29
The court finds that the City's zoning ordinance is not a safety measure
and therefore the express preemption language is not applicable. But the
court does find that the extensive regulation under the NGPSA relating to
pipeline safety and the extensive regulation under the NGA relating to
F.Supp.2d 1103 (N.D.Iowa 2003); Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC v. Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Council, 583 F.Supp.2d 259 (D.R.I. 2008).
125 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-58, § 311, 119 Stat. 594, 685 (2005).
126 The express preemption provision states that: "[tihe Commission shall have the
exclusive authority to approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expan-
sion, or operation of an LNG terminal." 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1). While preempting local
control in some areas, however, EPAct also embodies the notion of cooperative federal-
ism by allowing State participation in these types of decisions through their roles under
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act. See Is-
land East Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection,
482 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006).
127 79 F.Supp.2d 49, 147 O.&G.R. 128 (D.R.I. 2000).
128 42 U.S.C. §§ 60101-60137. The current statute is a combination of two earlier stat-
utes, the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 and the Hazardous Liquids Pipeline
Safety Act of 1979.
129 42 U.S.C. § 60104(c).
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the transportation of natural gas occupies the field.130 Another factor that
favors a finding that the field has been occupied is the need for uniform
regulation of both pipelines and LNG facilities. Furthermore the court
finds a direct conflict between the FERC order authorizing the LNG fa-
cility to expand and the City requirement that it seek a variance from the
no expansion of a nonconforming use regulation.
The Algonquin LNG court used a broad brush approach to both the
occupation of the field and conflict doctrines. A closer look at how these
doctrines apply that is analogous to the operational conflicts approach
that Colorado takes pursuant to Bowen/Edwards was taken by the court
in Texas Midstream Gas Services, L.L.C. v. City of Grand Prairie.3'
TMGS wants to build a natural gas compressor on a parcel it owns
within the City. The City's zoning ordinance is amended after the plans
are announced so that natural gas compressor stations are made discre-
tionary uses that are subject to a host of performance standards including
a minimum setback from adjoining parcels, fencing, sound amelioration
requirements, fagade requirements and architectural review. TMGS
makes a facial attack on the ordinance, arguing among other grounds that
the regulations are preempted under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act. 132
The court agrees with the Algonquin LNG court that the express
preemption provisions of the NGPSA do not apply because the provi-
130 See also National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 894 F.2d
571 (2d Cir. 1990); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 828 F.2d
465 (8" Cir. 1987); Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. Jackson Couty, 512 F.Supp. 1261
(D.Minn. 1981). There is a tension between the occupation of the field and conflict pre-
emption theories when it comes to federal statutes that embody some form of cooperative
federalism whereby states or substate units play some role in the decision making proc-
ess. See e.g., Weaver's Cove Energy, L.L.C. v. Rhode Island Coastal Resources Man-
agement Council, 583 F.Supp.2d 259 (D.R.I. 2008); Islander East Pipeline Co., LLC v.
Blumenthal, 478 F.Supp.2d 289 (D.Conn. 2007); Islander East Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v.
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, 467 F.3d 295, 163 O.&G.R. 159
(2d Cir. 2006); NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 153
O.&G.R. 121 (3r' Cir. 2001).
131 2008 WL 5000038 (N.D.Tex.). The careful analysis shown by Judge Fitzwater in
this case is also mirrored in the latest Supreme Court opinion on the preemption issue,
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S.Ct. 538 (2008) which reiterates the assumption that
Congress must show a clear and manifest purpose to preempt the historic police powers
of the State.
132 Another theory used by TMGS is the "eminent domain" theory whereby an entity
having the eminent domain power may not have its power thwarted through the exercise
of the police power by a governmental entity. The court rejects that claim by distinguish-
ing two Texas Supreme Court decisions that seemingly adopt that theory that had been
earlier rejected by a Texas Court of Appeals. Compare Austin Independent School Dis-
trict v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973) and City of Lubbock v. Aus-
tin, 628 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1982) with Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 489
S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App. 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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sions deal with matters of pipeline safety. Just as with the occupation of
the field theory, the definition of the field, or in this case, the scope and
extent of the express preemption language is critical. The court explores
the legislative history of the NGPSA and its principal focus on the area
of pipeline safety. The court distinguishes the earlier cases that had
found preemption under the NGPSA because they all involved matters
more directly related to public safety.'3 3 The court then distinguishes Al-
gonquin LNG on several grounds including the regulation of LNG facili-
ties not only under the NGPSA but also under the NGA. The zoning or-
dinance in Algonquin LNG covered many of the same areas as the FERC
review of the LNG facility siting application.
Even though there is some overlap in the subject matter between the
Federal and local regulation, that overlap does not make the local regula-
tion a preempted safety ordinance. Compressor stations, being above-
ground facilities, have aesthetic impacts that are not found with under-
ground pipelines. While a number of the City discretionary permit per-
formance standards do deal with the physical structure that will house the
compressor, only those standards that attempt to regulate safety issues
will be subjected to the express preemption provision. Aesthetic regula-
tion is not covered by the NGPSA and the court by looking at the moti-
vation behind the substate unit regulation may determine whether the
regulation does indeed serve an aesthetic, rather than a safety, purpose.' 34
The court looks at each of the performance standards contained in the
City's zoning ordinance and concludes that the only one that is a safety
standard is an iron fencing requirement. That provision is preempted and
cannot be enforced but the remaining standards may be severed and en-
forced because they are not preempted.
V. The Constitutional Problem:
Due Process and Regulatory Takings
As substate governmental units become more active in regulating
and/or prohibiting oil and gas drilling and production activities, the like-
lihood arises that there will be an increase in the amount of constitutional
challenges filed. Modem challenges, however, face the backdrop of cases
decided under what I have earlier called the "sausage" approach to con-
stitutional law.'35 In these cases, substantive due process, equal protec-
tion and regulatory takings analysis tend to be blended into one big sau-
sage. These early cases deal with both conservation and zoning regula-
133 See cases cited in note 130 supra.
'3 See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Pacific Gas & Electric, note
122 supra; Georgia Manufacture Housing Association v. Spalding County, 148 F.3d
1304 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
13 Bruce Kramer, The Pit and the Pendulum, The Pit and the Pendulum: Local GOv-
ernmentall REgulation of Oil and Gas Activities Returns From the Grave, 50 Inst. of Oil
& Gas L. & Taxn (1999) at 4-11.
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tory programs. A very perceptive and knowledgeable oil and gas aca-
demic and attorney commented on this "sausage" approach in the 1930s
as follows:
The more recent decisions clearly recognize that the power of a state
to enact regulations designed to protect the public's interest in these
natural resources is unaffected by the private property theory enter-
tained in the jurisdiction enacting or promulgating the regulation.
The only manner in which the nature of the landowner's property
interest becomes pertinent in determining the validity of a police
regulation enacted for this purpose is upon the issue of its reason-
ableness. If the public interest so demands, a landowner can be
completely denied the privilege of producing the oil or gas beneath
his land or realizing, in any way, the value thereof. However, the
state has no right to interfere with private property rights to any
greater extent than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the public
purpose. Hence, an attack may be made upon any police regulation,
designed to protect the public's interest, as unreasonable on the
ground that correlative common-law property rights have been un-
duly interfered with and discrimination caused which are unneces-
sary to the accomplishment of the public purpose. It would be the
duty of the court to strike down a regulation subject to this objection
as an unreasonable taking of private property despite the valid pur-
pose of the regulation . . . the question is the same: Has this com-
mon-law property right been interfered within an unreasonable
manner not necessary for the accomplishment of the avowed public
purpose. 36
This excerpt was written sixteen years after the decision in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon3 7 that ushered in the modem era of regulatory
takings jurisprudence. Penn Coal stands for the proposition that notwith-
standing the reasonableness of the government's objectives and the
means chosen to achieve those objectives, governmental regulation that
"goes too far" will violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the
taking of private property without the payment of just compensation.
Whether a regulation goes too far will depend on the application of an ad
hoc balancing test, looking in part to the impact of the regulation and the
public purposes served by the regulatory program. Notwithstanding Penn
Coal's separation of the regulatory takings and substantive due process
claims, A. W. Walker's article reflected at the time the two leading Su-
preme Court decisions that antedated Penn Coal and which applied the
"sausage" approach to determining the constitutional validity of police
136 A. W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect Upon Police
Regulation ofProduction, 16 U.Tex.L.Rev. 643, 650-51 (1938)(footnotes omitted).
m3 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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power regulation affecting oil and gas production activities.138 These
early decisions rely, in part, on the assumption that the owner of the right
to produce oil and gas does not have a corporeal interest in the oil and
gas in the ground. That is not the case as a majority of the major produc-
ing states have now adopted the "ownership in place" theory that gives to
the mineral owner a corporeal interest in the minerals, subject of course
to the rule of capture.'39 The choice of ownership regimes, however, is
not critical to either substantive due process or regulatory takings claims.
Governmental regulation of oil and gas drilling and production activities
should be judged under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments regardless
of the choice of ownership regime. State ownership definitions, however,
clearly have an impact because the Federal Constitution does not create
property rights, it merely recognizes state-created property rights.14 0
Regulating an activity that does not constitute a recognized or protected
property interest does not implicate either the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Just as the state may prohibit a property owner from oper-
ating a nuisance, a state may prohibit a mineral owner from engaging in
activities that its ownership interest does not authorize.
The Early Approach
Decisions from the pre-1950 period reflect a sausage grinder ap-
proach to constitutional challenges to municipal regulations affecting or
prohibiting oil and gas activities. The courts tended to combine substan-
tive due process analysis in the Lochner14 1 mode, equal protection analy-
sis and takings analysis. Nowhere is the sausage made more palatable
for regulatory bodies than in both the district court and court of appeals
decisions in Marrs v. City of Oxford.14 2 Both opinions reject the mineral
owner's claim that the mandatory pooling provisions, as well as the other
regulations, deprive them of a vested property interest. Relying on
Euclid and ignoring Mahon the court focuses on the reasonableness of
the city's actions. In addition, the court focuses on the nature of the in-
corporeal nature of the ownership of oil and gas, a canard that infects
both the Ohio Oil and Walls decisions. As noted above, even if one does
not own the corporeal oil and gas, one does own the right to capture it,
which is what is being regulated by the city. What is relevant is how the
"' See Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
177 U.S. 190 (1900). See also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911)
and Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665 (1895).
13 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers Oil and Gas Law § 203
(2007).
140 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
141 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
142 Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541 (D.Kan. 1928), aff'd, 32 F.2d 134 (8h Cir.
1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 573 (1929) (citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190
(1900) and Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920)).
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state defines the property interest, be it corporeal or incorporeal. If the
interest is subject to the correlative rights of other property interest own-
ers in the common source of supply, there can be no taking of property if
the legislature merely seeks to protect each individual owner's correla-
tive rights. All property rights are held subject to the exercise of the po-
lice power. The court observed:
Necessarily these regulations will encroach, when the power is ex-
ercised, on private rights; but that does not render them void. The
power has its limitations and when submitted for judicial review it
must appear that its exercise appropriately affords protection to the
public against threatened evils. Arbitrary and unreasonable regula-
tions, clearly ineffective in accomplishment of the claimed public
interest, will be stayed; but the presumption is in favor of a law or
ordinance passed in the exercise of the power, until the contrary is
shown.14 3
A more clear statement of classic substantive due process analysis would
be hard to come by. Thus, even 7 years after Mahon the courts appar-
ently did not understand the monumental change it had wrought.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed the Marrs approach in Pat-
terson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.14 4 This case involved a well spacing
and compulsory pooling statute, that required royalty owners within a
spacing unit to have their interests pooled and thus diminished based on a
surface acreage formula. The royalty owner of a drill site tract argued
that the reduction in his royalty violated his federal and state constitu-
tional takings, due process and equal protection rights. The court, how-
ever, followed the sausage grinder, pre-Mahon approach by focusing to-
tally on the police power of the state without looking at the diminution in
value to the private property interest. The court observed:
... the lawful exercise of the state's power to protect the correlative
rights of owners in a common source of supply of oil and gas is not
a proper subject for the invocation of the provisions of either the
State or Federal Constitution which prohibit the taking of property
without just compensation or without due process of law. . . As we
view it, the property here involved has not been taken or confis-
cated: its use has merely been restricted and qualified. This does not
violate the due process clause of either Constitution. And this would
be true even though the plaintiff were able to prove a distinct loss to
himself through the operation of the statutes putting said police
power into force and effect.145
143 Marrs, 32 F.2d at 139.
'44 Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 1938 OK 138, 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83,
appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 376 (1939).
145 77 P.2d at 89. The court also relied on a Texas Supreme Court decision finding the
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While relying in part on the correlative rights definition of a property
interest, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision was clearly based on a
pre-Mahon analysis of regulatory takings claims. Although I believe that
well spacing and compulsory pooling programs would meet a Penn Coal
or Lucas challenge, the major oil and gas conservation programs did not
have to undergo that type of analysis in their formative years.146
Similar analyses were forthcoming in constitutional challenges to
municipal zoning ordinances that affected oil and gas operations. For
example, in Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co. v. Oklahoma City,14 7 an oil and
gas lessee challenged the validity of an ordinance restricting oil and gas
development in a newly-annexed area. Upon annexation the land was
zoned in a residential district. Oil and gas drilling activities were limited
to those areas zoned for industrial uses. The lessee argued that the zoning
ordinance interfered with his vested property right to drill, relying in
large part on Penn Coal. He also argued that the ordinance was unrea-
sonable since the tract in question was largely in a rural area while some
of the industrial zoned districts had residences included therein.14 8 He
also asserted that his drilling activities can be placed so as not to be close
to any existing or planned residence.
The court rejected all of these arguments, relying in large part on
Euclid and Hadachek v. Sebastian.14 9 The sole issue for the court was the
reasonableness of the city's action in wanting to prevent oil and gas de-
velopment from occurring in portions of the city that are devoted to, or
will be devoted to, residential uses. The court dismissed, almost without
note the claim that the lessee had a property interest to drill for oil and
gas that could not be interfered with by the exercise of the zoning power.
Ignoring the Mahon balancing test which would have required the court
to look at the effect of the regulation on the lessee's property interest, the
court affirmed the application of the zoning ordinance to the lessee's
right even where the lease was executed prior to the time the land was
annexed into the city.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in uphold-
ing the general validity of the Oklahoma City zoning ordinance that pro-
Dallas zoning ordinance constitutional, using the uni-dimensional approach of focusing
solely on the validity of the government's actions without looking to the loss in value and
restrictions placed on the private property interest. Id. at 89-90 citing Lombardo v. City
of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934).
14 For a similar treatment of Oklahoma's ratable take statute, which was applied to set
minimum takes and prices, see Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 1950
OK 4, 203 Okla. 35, 220 P.2d 279, aff'd, 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
147 Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co. v. Oklahoma City, 14 F.Supp. 370 (D.Okla. 1930).
148 The Oklahoma City ordinance is a classic Euclidean zoning ordinance which al-
lows lesser intensive uses in more intensive use districts. 14 F.Supp. at 373-4.
149 Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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hibited oil and gas drilling in various districts throughout the city in
Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust.o50 An oil and gas lessee whose
lease was located only 900 feet from the district boundary line where
drilling was allowed and only 600 feet from the boundary line where
compulsory pooling was authorized challenged the zoning ordinance as a
taking of his property interest. The court made several powerful state-
ments regarding the power of government to restrict private property in-
terests without relying on the non-ownership doctrine. The court ob-
served:
The right of an individual to use his property as he pleases is a
qualified as distinguished from an absolute right. It is at all times
circumscribed by the authority of the state under its police power to
fairly and reasonably restrict the use of private property to the end
that the public health, welfare and safety will be promoted and such
uses of private property prevented as would injuriously affect the
rights of others in the use and enjoyment of their property. This
power is an attribute of sovereignty and rests inherently with the
state.. .15
The court further added that the police power was not merely lim-
ited to regulations prescribing how oil and gas was to be produced, but
whether it was to be produced at all. The Court applied a form of recip-
rocal advantage argument regarding regulatory takings that had been es-
poused by Justice Brandeis in dissent in Penn Coal. The fact that others
were being restricted was a form of compensation and limited the court's
ability to find such actions unconstitutional. This statement was all the
more surprising given the fact that the owner's land was located so close
to the drilling district boundary line that drainage was undoubtedly going
to occur so that the owner would essentially lose all of its oil and gas
through the operation of the rule of capture to the adjoining owners.
Another facet of the regulatory takings doctrine deals with the con-
cept of "vested rights." A person having a vested right to develop is said
to be immune from later changes in the regulatory scheme.152 Such an
150 Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust, 1934 OK 398, 168 Okla. 609, 35 P.2d
435. The year before Beveridge, the court applied a similar analysis in upholding a deci-
sion not to issue a well drilling permit to an operator where the well would be located in a
no-drilling buffer zone, even though there is evidence that the oil and gas would be
drained to an adjacent operator. Anderson-Kerr, Inc. v. Van Meter, 1933 OK 156, 162
Okla. 176, 19 P.2d 1068.
Is1 35 P.2d at 439.
152 The early judicial decisions on vested rights often had late vested rights rules, re-
quiring the developer to obtain a building permit or the last required permit before vest-
ing. See e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission,
17 Cal.3d 785, 132 Cal.Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977). The cases are collected in Dan Mandelker, Land Use Law, note 27 supra at §§
6.15-6.16. The cases often reflect a later vested rights rule than the last discretionary
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argument was made as it applied to the bonding requirement imposed by
Oklahoma City in C.C Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. City of Oklahoma
City.153 The oil and gas operator complained that the order enjoining the
continued drilling of a well came only days before the well was to be
completed and thus interfered with its vested right to complete the well.
The City's bonding requirement was a valid exercise of the police power.
The operator's failure to comply with the ongoing regulatory require-
ments cannot be excused by the fact that it may have owned the oil and
gas interest prior to the effective date of the municipal ordinance. The
court stated: " . . . a permit does not exempt applicant from the operation
of subsequent ordinances and regulations lefally enacted by the corpora-
tion in the exercise of its police powers."' 5 Where the city took an ap-
propriate period of time to adopt a comprehensive zoning scheme, it may
enact a temporary moratoria or ordinance designed to effectuate the pur-
poses of the proposed zoning ordinance. 5 5 The role of the court was lim-
ited in reviewing the validity of a police power enactment clearly de-
signed to protect the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
Courts will not easily exempt from police power regulations, private ac-
tors whose actions may threaten the public health.
The high point for zoning regulation of oil and gas o erations was
reflected in Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles.1  Marblehead
was the lessor of a 291 acre tract located on the outskirts of the City of
Los Angeles. The lessee had erected a derrick on the lease when the city
sought to enjoin further operations since their recently enacted zoning
ordinance did not allow such a use in a residential district. The nearest
existing home to the derrick was some 1130 feet away. Evidence was
adduced at trial showing the hazards associated with oil and gas drilling
and production operations. Further testimony was introduced showing
the deleterious impact of oil and gas wells on residences and other uses.
The owner argued that the zoning ordinance's prohibition against drilling
was no different than the state prohibition against mining which caused
subsidence in Penn Coal. While noting that unlike traditional businesses
permit rule of Avco. Increasingly, state legislatures are enacting vested rights statutes that
provide for an earlier vested rights rule. See e.g., Tex.Loc. Gov't Code §§ 245.001 et seq.
(Vested rights attach at time when the initial permit application is filed).
153 1934 OK 88, 167 Okla. 384, 29 P.2d 952. See also Hud Oil & Refining Co. v. City
of Oklahoma City, 1934 OK 94, 167 Okla. 457, 30 P.2d 169.
1s4 29 P.2d at 953.
1ss See McCurley v. City of El Reno, 1929 OK 306, 138 Okla. 92, 280 P. 467. The
United States Supreme Court has held that a temporary moratorium does not constitute a
regulatory taking even if it lasts for over 2 years. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 302 (2002).
' Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 ( 9 1h Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 634 (1931).
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which can move, oil and gas extraction activities must take place where
the oil and gas is located. 7 The court observed:
If there is any difference between the taking of the unearned incre-
ment by zoning ordinances and the taking of the inherent value of
the soil or its contents, it arises from the fact that it might be deemed
unreasonable to prevent a man from developing natural gas upon his
property and reasonable to prohibit the erection of gas works, be-
cause in the form former or latter? case gas works can be erected in
other suitable zones or districts in the city, while in the case of natu-
ral gas it must be produced from the land in which it exists... In ei-
ther event, however, there can be no question of the inherent right of
the city to control or prohibit such production, provided it is done
reasonably and not arbitrarily. 58
Thus the argument is still couched in terms of reasonableness even
where a clear takings claim was made. When you go further and add
Euclid's strong presumption of validity and fairly debatable scope of ju-
dicial review, attacking zoning ordinances prohibiting oil and gas devel-
opment in residential districts became nearly impossible. The court also
rejected a vested rights claim notwithstanding the expenditure of sub-
stantial sums by the oil and gas lessee at a time when the acreage was
outside of the purview of the zoning ordinance. But the court found no
vested right to the existing state of zoning, otherwise no zoning amend-
ments or boundary changes would ever be valid. One cannot have a
vested right to existing zoning, but one can have a vested right upon ei-
ther the issuance of a permit or the expenditure of substantial sums in
reliance on the extant zoning. The court summarily dismissed the
owner's claims and concludes:
... but a mere change of policy or of legislation, however unfortu-
nate the result may be to appellants, does not justify the courts in
declaring void an ordinance exercising legitimate police power. The
loss suffered by the appellants by reason of this change in legislative
policy is no more a taking of their property than is the loss resulting
to them by reason of being deprived of the right to develop the oil
on their propertv or the right to use their land for other than resi-
dence purposes.
1 This argument is regularly made in mineral cases, although starting with Hadachek
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), it has not been very persuasive, except perhaps in the
non-conforming use cases. Kramer, Local Land Use Regulation, note * supra at 77-84.
s5 47 F.2d at 532.
159 Id. at at 534. A dissenting judge would have followed Mahon and found that the
prohibition against drilling "went too far" insofar as it affects the rights of the mineral
lessee and royalty owner. Id. at 537 (Sawtelle, J. dissenting).
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Similar results were reached in other jurisdictions relying on Euclid and
its highly deferential scope of judicial review of local zoning deci-
sions. 160
It was not only the early cases which found no regulatory taking in
the application of a zoning ordinance to a mineral owner which had the
effect of prohibiting all drilling operations over a known reservoir. In
Blancett v. Montgomery, 61 the Kentucky Court of Appeals turned back a
challenge to a zoning ordinance that totally prohibited oil and gas drilling
operations in residential zones. The oil and gas lessee of a tract of unde-
veloped land located adjacent to a reservoir being produced from wells
located outside of the city's boundaries, argued that the total prohibition
amounts to a regulatory taking by preventing the lessee from producing
the hydrocarbons which are being drained to the already-producing
wells. Without citing Mahon and relying on Marblehead Land the court
applied the general substantive due process reasonableness test and
found no regulatory taking without a mention of the effect of the zoning
ordinance on the property interests of the mineral owner.
A similar approach was taken by a California court in a constitu-
tional attack on the Los Angeles County zoning and oil drilling ordi-
nances in Friel v. County of Los Angeles.162 The county ordinance only
authorized oil and gas drilling in industrial zones as a matter of right. The
county retained some flexibility and acknowledged that oil and gas res-
ervoirs do not necessarily follow the boundaries of industrial zones by
allowing discretionary permits to be issued to allow such drilling in other
zones where appropriate.16 3 In Friel the oil and gas lessee sought vari-
ances to drill in residential zones in order to produce oil that the lessee
was claiming was being drained from nearby wells located in an indus-
trial zone. While the lots in question were residentially zoned, the area in
general was surrounded by industrial uses. In addition, the lessee urged
that oil and gas was being drained from under his tract to the adjacent
wells. Notwithstanding the allegations of drainage and the assertion that
the residential zoning district was an "island" amidst an ocean of indus-
o60 See e.g., Friel v. County of Los Angeles, 172 Cal.App.2d 142, 342 P.2d 374, 11
O.&G.R. 155 (1959); Wood v. City Planning Commission, 130 Cal.App.2d 356, 279
P.2d 95 (1955); Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. App. 1966); Van Meter v.
Westgate Oil Co., 1934 OK 287, 168 Okla. 200, 32 P.2d 719.
161 Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.App. 1966).
162 Friel v. County of Los Angeles, 172 Cal.App.2d 142, 342 P.2d 374, 11 O.&G.R.
155 (1959).
163 The discretionary permit system was attacked after several permits were issued in
No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 196 Cal.App.3d 223, 242 Cal.Rptr. 37 (1987, cert.
denied). The operator not only had to seek a discretionary permit but also had to prepare
a state environmental impact report before the City Council could create a drilling district
and issue a drilling permit.
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trial uses, the court found that the ordinance as applied is neither "confis-
catory, arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable or void... "164
While a clear majority of courts were upholding both per se and as
applied constitutional attacks against municipal zoning ordinances that
restricted or prohibited the drilling of oil and gas wells, a number of judi-
cial decisions invalidated, typically on an as applied basis, municipal
zoning decisions. For example, in City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 6 5
the Michigan Supreme Court essentially "second-guessed" a municipal
zoning decision to place the plaintiffs land in a zone where oil and gas
drilling was prohibited. The court found that after a careful inspection of
the zoning map, the city's decision to place the land in question in a resi-
dential district was unreasonable. The land was more suited to industrial
development and the location of an oil and gas drilling operations would
not cause grave negative externalities to the surrounding neighborhood.
This type of judicial interference with legislative line-drawing was fore-
shadowed by the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Nectow
v. City of Cambridge,166 which two years after Euclid invalidated a mu-
nicipal zoning ordinance on an as applied basis, in what can only be de-
scribed as a less deferential view as to what constitutes the general wel-
fare that is served by a zoning ordinance. As noted earlier, the prevailing
view in the United States is that of Euclid and not Nectow insofar as ju-
dicial review of "line-drawing" contests are concerned.
In Nalbone v. Borough of Youngsville,'67 an oil and gas owner chal-
lenged the validity of two Borough ordinances, one requiring that a dis-
cretionary permit be issued before any oil and gas drilling or reworking
operations be conducted and the second requiring all wells to be located
in "oil production districts" as designated on the official zoning map.
Because the trial court, for unknown reasons, did not take any evidence
as to whether the application of the ordinance to the plaintiffs property
constituted a regulatory taking, the issue would be remanded to the trial
court so that a proper record may be created that would support the trial
court's finding that the ordinances were not confiscatory. The court
merely stated that the ordinance may be "so restrictive" as to be uncon-
stitutional, but left to the trial judge the determination of that issue.
In Braly v. Board of Fire Commissioners,"8 the takings argument
was successfully made as the court ignored the Marblehead Land ap-
16 342 P.2d at 383. The court relies on Marblehead Land, note 126 supra and distin-
guishes the several California cases which had found oil drilling ordinances invalid as
applied. See note 30 supra.
165 City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
6 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
167 Nalbone v. Borough of Youngsville, 104 Pa.Cmwith. 623, 522 A.2d 1173 (1987).
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proach and focused on the true impact that drilling prohibitions have on
oil and gas owners. The owners of a 2 acre tract of land challenged a
board regulation which prohibited the drilling of oil wells within 75 feet
of any existing public street or within 50 feet of the boundary of an exist-
ing drilling unit. The tract was so situated that no drillsite could be lo-
cated that met the dual spacing requirements. A takings claim was made
by the owner. While California is a non-ownership jurisdiction, the court
accurately noted that the mineral owner has a property interest in search-
ing for and reducing to possession oil and gas. That right to search for oil
was just as valuable a property right as the right that attaches once the oil
was captured.169 While a well spacing regulation may be valid per se, an
as applied attack has to be reviewed in light of the individual circum-
stances of the case. Here the municipal ordinance did not provide for a
compulsory pooling of small tract owners. Even if voluntary pooling was
theoretically available to the small tract owner, that would not meet the
constitutional burden imposed by the takings clause. Where a small tract
is surrounded by existing producing properties, a well spacing ordinance
that does not provide for compulsory pooling cannot be applied to deny
the oil and gas owner the right to drill.
One pre-Euclid decision might have been the harbinger of things to
come had it not been for the Euclid emphasis on judicial deference to
legislative zoning decisions. In Pacific Palisades Association v. City of
Huntington Beach, 0 the City enacted an ordinance prohibiting the drill-
ing of oil wells in residentially zoned districts. Plaintiff owned some
acreage located within that district which was also located over a proven
oil-bearing reservoir. Relying in part on Penn Coal, the court observed:
The effect of the ordinance, absolutely prohibiting the maintenance
or operation of oil wells within certain designated limits of the city
of Huntington beach, is to deprive the owners of real property
within such limits of a valuable right incident to their ownership.
While the use to which one may put his property may be restricted
or regulated by the state, in the exercise of its police power, so far as
it may be necessary to protect others from injury from such use, it is
elementary that the enjoyment of the property cannot be interfered
with or limited arbitrarily.' 7 '
169 The court relies heavily on Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947)
which invalidates a state well spacing rule which does not have a pooling component.
no Pacific Palisades Association v. City of Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 P.
538 (1925).
17 237 P. at 539. Note that the court still talks about arbitrary police power regulation,
rather than police power regulation which amounts to a taking, as Justice Holmes had
done in Mahon. The court relies on a hard rock mining case, In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82
P. 241 (1905) which invalidates a total prohibition against quarrying. See Kramer, Local
Land Use Regulation, note * supra at 46-51. The court does not cite Hadachek v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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The first major post-Penn Coal challenge to oil and gas conserva-
tion legislation was heard by the Supreme Court in 1932. In Champlin
Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission 72 the market demand prora-
tioning regulatory program was attacked by an oil producer asserting that
the program was "repugnant to the due process and equal protection
clauses..."" Simply asserted the plaintiff "insists that it has a vested
right to drill wells and to take all the natural flow of oil and gas there-
from so long as it does so without physical waste and devotes the pro-
duction to commercial uses."1 74 As had the earlier cases, the court relied
on the state's adoption of the non-ownership and correlative rights doc-
trines that limit the nature or extent of one's property ownership of oil
and gas. The court relied on potential damage to the common source of
supply by the premature dissipation of reservoir energy as a limiting fac-
tor to the plaintiffs property interest. Thus it simply concluded that the
prorationing system which limited the production from Champlin's wells
was not an "arbitrary interference with private business or plaintiffs
property rights. . .
In Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court,176 producers of oil and
gas challenged the enforcement of a California statute that made unlaw-
ful the unreasonable waste of natural gas. The state had ordered the pro-
ducer to reduce its daily production of gas from 57,120 MCF to 27,187
MCF. The court relying on the pre-Mahon decisions had no difficulty
concluding that no constitutional rights were violated in the state's ef-
forts to adjust the correlative rights of those owners who shared in the
common source of supply. The reasonableness of the injunction was a
question of fact which the Supreme Court would not try anew. The state
court opinion, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court was even more
explicit in its reliance on the correlative rights approach to ownership to
deny that the state regulation constituted either a taking of property with-
out just compensation or a due process violation. The court observed:
It is the coexistence of these rights (rule of capture, ed.) which au-
thorizes the state to make use of its legislative power. When the
rights of one impinge upon the rights of others the state may inter-
pose for the purpose of adjusting and regulating the enjoyment of
those rights.' Y
172 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
173 286 U.S. at 232.
17 286 U.S. at 233.
7 Id. at 234 relying in part on Ohio Oil, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) and Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
176 Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
1 Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal.App. 123, 293 P. 899, 901
(1930), aff'd, 284 U.S. 8 1931).
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Thus the state court injunction enforcing the administrative order limit-
ing production so as to prevent waste was affirmed
A similar challenge was made to a ratable take and market proration
order of the Railroad Commission with much different results in Thomp-
son v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.'78 A daily production limit was
set for the East Panhandle Field, the West Sweet Panhandle Field and the
West Sour Panhandle Field. The total daily allowable then was allocated
to individual wells and the pipeline purchasers were required to purchase
ratably from those wells. Plaintiffs, under the order, would have to limit
production from their own wells and purchase production from other
wells in order to fulfill their contract delivery obligations. This was the
first Supreme Court decision dealing with an ownership-in-place juris-
diction. While noting that the common law property interests in oil and
gas did not provide a remedy against depleting the common source of
supply,'79 the court observed that the Legislature has been regulating and
prohibiting wasteful conduct since 1899. The lower court, after examin-
ing the facts, concluded that the order was not intended to prevent waste,
but was merely designed to adjust the correlative rights of the parties in
the common source of supply. The Supreme Court applies a Lochner
substantive due process approach and essentially second guessed the
Legislature's and Commission's objectives in regulating takes from in-
dependent natural gas producers. The court, however, while striking
down the statute and the Commission order, confirmed the general con-
stitutional validity of conservation regulation when it stated:
Either production greater than the demand or use for an inferior
purpose would necessarily involve overground waste of gas. The
manner, place or extent of production might lead to underground
waste. We assume that the prohibition of any wasteful conduct,
whether primarily on behalf of other owners of gas in the common
reservoir, or because of? the public interests involved, is consistent
with the Constitution of Texas and that of the United States, and that
to prevent waste production may be prorated. We assume, also, that
the State may constitutionally prorate production in order to prevent
undue drainage of gas from the reserves of well owners lacking pipe
line connections. If proration were lawfully applied for any such
purposes, the fact that thereby other private persons would inciden-
tally and gratuitously obtain important benefits would present no
constitutional obstacle.(footnotes omitted) 80
178 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
17 300 U.S. at 68 citing Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 298
S.W. 554 (Tex.Comm.App. 1927).
Iso 300 U.S. at 76-77.
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Thus while invalidating the order before it the court reaffirmed its sau-
sage grinder approval for conservation regulation even though it could
not rely on the non-ownership theory to bolster the view that property
interests are not being taken.
The Modern Regulatory Takings Approach
The following excerpt from the author's treatise'81 gives a thumb-
nail sketch of modem takings jurisprudence that has evolved since Penn
Coal was decided in 1922:
While the modem takings era dates back to 1922,182 most oil and
gas conservation programs that had a direct impact on private prop-
erty rights had already received the constitutional blessing of the
Supreme Court.183 In post-1922 cases, both the Supreme Court of
the United States and various state supreme courts tended to com-
bine the due process and takings analysis while upholding the valid-
ity of various state oil and gas conservation regulatory programs.'"
Modem takings jurisprudence begins with First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,'85where the Supreme
Court of the United States firmly held that if a regulation went so far
181 2 Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick H. Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization
§24.01[2] (2007).
18 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is generally considered the
beginning of modem takings jurisprudence. The material that follows is only intended to
be a brief introduction to the regulatory takings conundrum which has confounded much
greater and lucid minds than me. See e.g., Jan Laitos, Law of Property Rights Protection
(Aspen Law & Business 1999); William Fischel, Regulatory Takings (1995); Richard
Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985); Joseph
Sax, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971); Frank Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation "Law, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (1967).
18 See e.g., Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indi-
ana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
' See e.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
185 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987). One of the issues raised by First English was whether there would be a "tempo-
rary" taking in the inevitable delay between applying for a land use permit and the even-
tual decision. The Supreme Court specifically eschewed holding that normal delays in
obtaining building pennits, changes in zoning ordinances, and the like would constitute a
taking. Id. at 321. A similar argument was made by an unleased mineral owner who as-
serted that a delay in a compulsory pooling hearing, followed by a dismissal of the appli-
cation, constituted a taking of his property interest. White v. Amoco Production Co.,
1985 OK 55, 704 P.2d 470, 85 O.&G.R. 616. The court concluded that the property
owner's interests were not taken during the pendency of the compulsory pooling hearing
process. The mineral estate could have been leased at any time, subject to the Commis-
sion's exercise of its power to pool. The mere fact that potential lessees might be scared
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as to constitute a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment,
then compensation was due the property owner. What ensued fol-
lowing First English may aptly be described as attempts to catego-
rize takings cases. It is clear that if the government physically occu-
pies a property interest, there will always be a taking, no matter how
small the physical occupation.'86 Likewise, where the government
has deprived the owner of all beneficial use of the property interest,
there is a per se taking.'87 In addition, there are special rules that ap-
ply to governmental permits requiring the transfer of property inter-
ests to the government in exchange for permit approval. 88 If one
cannot fit within one of the categories, presumably one is back to a
balancing test, that is, by judicial admission, ad hoc in nature. 1 9 Af-
ter Agins v. City of Tiburon,' it was presumed that one could show
a regulatory taking if one could prove that the regulation did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest. In Lingle v. Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc.,191 however, the Supreme Court treated the Agins
substantially advance test as dicta and said that such a regulation
would not violate the Takings Clause. Finally, there are procedural
rules, most notably the requirement that a final government decision
be rendered in order to make a takings challenge ripe, that affect this
type of litigation.192
The absence of oil and gas cases applying modern takings jurispru-
dence, rather than the sausage grinder approach, has been changing in
recent years. The two major categories of regulatory takings claims are
usually referred to by the name of the Supreme Court case that an-
nounced the test. The Lucas total taking test provides, in a greatly simpli-
fied definition, that if the government removes all economically viable or
186 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The inverse
condemnation cases dealing with the flooding of the surface estate which prevents oil and
gas drilling activities may, under some circumstances, be treated as a physical invasion.
Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. #1 v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909,
119 O.&G.R. 580 (Tex. 1993).
187 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
18 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
189 Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DiBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
'9 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
191 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
92 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). There
may be statute of limitations issues as well. Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 957
S.W.2d 625, 138 O.&G.R. 454 (Tex.App.[141h Dist.] 1997, writ ref'd), cert. denied 525
U.S. 1010, reh'g denied 525 U.S. 1172 (1999).
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feasible uses from a tract of land, that is a per se taking.193 The Penn
Central ad hoc balancing test applies to all other regulatory takings
claims and requires the court to balance the loss in the owner's reason-
able investment-backed expectations with the government's interest in
the regulation.194 It is not surprising that regulation of oil and gas opera-
tions can lead to claims that a Lucas per se taking has occurred, not only
because of the result should the litigant be successful but because of the
nature of the regulation of oil and gas operations.
A key issue in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred
under either the Lucas or Penn Central tests is the so-called "denomina-
tor" or the aggregate/disaggregate problem.'95 What the court must do
before it makes a regulatory takings determination is to define the nature
of the property interest allegedly taken. This is especially true where
mineral interests are involved. The predominant test now in use applies
the "aggregate" or "parcel as a whole" theory, taking into consideration
the economic expectations of the property owner.19 Factors the courts
will look at to determine what the "whole" parcel entails, includes the
degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the par-
cel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which the regulated
lands enhance the value of the remaining lands.197
In Animas Valley Sand & Gravel Co. v. Board of County Commis-
sioners, 198 the Colorado Supreme Court provided a model example of
how the "aggregate" test should be applied in a minerals context. A
county zoning ordinance prohibited certain types of mining activities.
Some of the lands owned by the plaintiff fell within the no-mining dis-
tricts. The court determined that there is neither a Lucas nor a Penn Cen-
tral taking because the entire parcel owned by the plaintiff included areas
where economically viable uses could take place. There are cases that
193 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
19 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn
Central is a refinement of the Penn Coal balancing test.
19s Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 327 (2002); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7
(1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500-01
(1987); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978).
196 See cases cited in note 199 infra. See also Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. United States,
57 Fed.C1. 115, 121, 161 O.&G.R. 232 (2003), on reconsideration, 62 Fed.C1. 481, 161
O.&G.R. 269 (2003); Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365
(Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1999).
9 Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. United States, note 196 supra, 57Fed.CL. at 121 (2003)
citing Ciampitti v. United States, 22 CI.Ct. 310, 318 (1991).
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agree with this approach,' and cases that disagree. 200 It is not surprising
that cases that apply the aggregate approach are much less likely to find
either a Lucas or Penn Central taking than those that apply the disaggre-
gate approach.
The aggregate/disaggregate problem also arises where there is activ-
ity prior to the imposition of a regulation that either diminishes or totally
negates the ability of the mineral owner to enjae in further production
activities. In RIth Energy, Inc. v. United States, the owner of a revoked
coal mining permit argued that because it was no longer able to mine any
coal, it had successfully asserted a Lucas total taking. The court rejected
that view, concluding that where has been substantial production prior to
the permit revocation, that earlier production would defeat a Lucas tak-
ings claim and required the court to apply the Penn Central approach.
As discussed earlier, many zoning ordinances require the issuance
of a discretionary permit before oil and gas drilling activities can be con-
ducted. It is typical for zoning ordinances to authorize the imposition of
conditions upon the issuance of a discretionary permit in order to en-
hance the general welfare. In Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop,20 2 the owner of the
surface and mineral estates challenged the City of Lansing's decision to
not issue a building permit and for imposing onerous conditions before
I" See Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. United States, note 162 supra; Forest Properties, Inc.
v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed.Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 951 (2002); Jent-
gen v. United States, 228 Ct.C1. 527, 657 F.2d 1210 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1017
(1982); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.C1. 476, 657 F.2d 1184 (1981), cert. de-
nied 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Karam v. State Department of Environmental Protection, 308
N.J.Super. 225, 705 A.2d 1221 (1998), aff'd, 157 N.J. 187, 723 A.2d 943 (1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 814 (1999); K & K Construction, Inc. v. Department of Natural Re-
sources, 456 Mich. 570, 575 N.W.2d 531 (1998); State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v.
Clark County Board of Commissioners, 2007-Ohio-5022, 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 875
N.E.2d 59; Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 569 Pa. 3, 799 A.2d 751,
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1002 (2002); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis.2d 365, 548
N.W.2d 528 (1996).
200 See Loveladies Harbor v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus-
tries, Inc. v. U.S., 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed.Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995);
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed.Cir. 1991); State ex rel.
R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 2002-Ohio-6716, 98 Ohio St.3d 1, 780 N.E.2d 998, 160 O.&G.R.
667 (2002), reh'g denied, 2003-Ohio-644, 98 Ohio St.3d 1457, 783 N.E.2d 517, motion
granted by, 2004-Ohio-449, 101 Ohio St.3d 1451, 802 N.E.2d 1125. The underlying
rationale of the R.T.G. decision was undermined by State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v.
Clark County Board of Commissioners, 2007-Ohio-5022, 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 875
N.E.2d 59 which held where there was a unified estate you did not look to the mineral
estate alone to determine if there was a total Lucas taking.
201 44 Fed.C1. 108, 146 O.&G.R. 193 (1999), reconsideration denied, 44 Fed.C1. 366
(1999), aff'd, 247 F.3d 1355, 156 O.&G.R. 252 (Fed.Cir. 2001), reh'g denied, 270 F.3d
1347, 156 O.&G.R. 268 (Fed.Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 958 (2002).
202 There are two opinions relevant to our discussion in this case, one reported, the
other unreported. Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 1992 WL 223772 (D.Kan. 1992), 792 F.Supp.
1205, 120 O.&G.R. 480 (D.Kan. 1992).
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an oil and gas drilling permit would be issued. At the time that Mid Gulf
sought a discretionary permit to drill, no oil and gas drilling ordinance
was in place. Two other drilling permits had been issued by the City on
an ad hoc basis prior to the time of Mid Gulf's application. Two days
after receiving the drilling permit application, the City enacted a 90 day
moratorium on the issuance of discretionary permits for oil and gas drill-
ing operations. During the 90 day period, the City conducted a series of
public hearings and adopted a drilling ordinance which imposed, at a
minimum, the following conditions on the issuance of a drilling permit:
1. Obtaining a $ 100,000 surety bond, 2. Obtaining a $ 2,000,000 general
liability insurance policy, 3. Prohibiting maintenance of any tank battery
within city limits, 4. Limiting noise to certain defined levels; and 5. Lim-
iting activities on the drillsite during the evening hours.203
These conditions were alleged to amount to a regulatory taking of
Mid Gulf's mineral estate. Because the case was decided prior to Lucas,
there was no separate allegation that all economically beneficial uses had
been taken, although it may have been possible to make that claim if the
mineral owner could show that the mandatory conditions were too oner-
ous for anyone to comply with. The court thus applied the traditional
balancing approach to regulatory takings cases; whether the regulation
substantially advanced a legitimate state interest and whether it denied an
owner all economically viable uses of the land. 204 As noted above the
substantially advance test, at least at the Federal constitutional level is no
longer appropriate in resolving a 5 th Amendment takings claim. The
court had no trouble finding that the regulation of oil and gas drilling
activities substantially advanced several legitimate state interests. The
issue then focused on the balancing of the public and private interests,
primarily on the diminution in value or interference with reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations. As discussed above, a key issue in this
case involved defining what was the affected property interest. In this
case, the issue was whether the court should consider the mineral estate
as the affected estate (disaggregate approach) or the combined sur-
face/mineral estate as the affected estate (aggregate approach). The court
chose the aggregate approach and looked at the diminution of value to
both estates. This issue is especially critical in a Lucas challenge since
whether there has been a deprivation of all uses clearly depends on what
interest has been denied a permit. Thus an unconditional denial of a drill-
ing permit might constitute a regulatory taking under Lucas if the owner
203 1992 WL 223772 at page 2.
204 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). That portion of Agins dealing with
the substantially advance test has been repudiated. Lingle, note 157 supra. One still must
consider, however, the governmental interest in the regulation when one applies the Penn
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merely owned the mineral estate, but would not a Lucas taking if the
owner retained economically viable uses of the surface estate.
The court did not resolve the balancing test in this case which would
have required an examination of the imposed conditions and their effect
on the potential uses or value of the mineral estate because the case was
not ripe for review. As noted earlier, regulatory takings claims are not
ripe for review until such time as a final permit decision has been
reached. In this case, Mid Gulf did not seek judicial review of the provi-
sions of the discretionary permit that might have modified them. Modifi-
cation would obviate a finding of a permanent taking, but still would not
answer the question of whether a temporary taking had occurred. None-
theless, the court refused to find that a regulatory taking occurred when
the City imposed its conditions on the discretionary permit.
While many of the cases discussed earlier, upheld without objection
total prohibitions against the drilling of oil and gas wells, in Miller
Brothers v. Department of Natural Resources, 205 the court had little dif-
ficulty concluding that a total prohibition against drilling, even for con-
servation purposes, constituted a regulatory taking. The court was apply-
ing Michigan law, not federal law, influenced in part by a doctrine that
invalidates total prohibitions against any lawful use without a very strong
showing that the prohibition was required to protect the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. 206 The statute that was found to be a
regulatory taking prohibited the drilling of wells within the Nordhouse
Dunes Area, encompassing some 4000 acres.
In Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston,207 the Texas court was
confronted with the classic regulatory takings claim. The City enacted an
ordinance prohibiting the drilling of oil and gas wells within the water-
shed of a city-owned lake. There was no variance procedure contained in
the ordinance. Trail was a successor in interest to an oil and gas lessee of
lands located within the no-drill zone. They petitioned the City for a
variance, notwithstanding the lack of a variance mechanism in the ordi-
nance. The City refused to hold a hearing. The plaintiffs asserted various
constitutional claims including a regulatory taking. Although not getting
to the merits of the takings claim, the court did indicate in dicta that it
was not going to follow the Michigan approach to total prohibitions
205 Miller Brothers v. Department of Natural Resources, 203 Mich.App. 674, 513
N.W.2d 217, 128 O.&G.R. 518, review denied, 447 Mich. 1038, 527 N.W.2d 513 (1994).
2 This land use doctrine is followed in Michigan and Pennsylvania, and has been
applied to mineral extraction cases. See e.g., Silva v. Ada, 416 Mich. 153, 330 N.W.2d
663 (1982); Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d
169 (1967).
207 Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 957 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.App.-Hous.[14th
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against drilling amounting to a per se regulatory taking. After citing a
number of Texas cases acknowledging the existence of the regulatory
taking cause of action (inverse condemnation), the court observed:
The United States Supreme Court has stated, "governmental regula-
tion-by definition-involves the adjustment of rights for the public
good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or
economic exploitation of private property. To require compensation
in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government
to regulate by purchase.". . . When a government regulates a right,
prohibits some noxious use, or if the public need outweighs the pri-
vate loss, compensation should not be allowed.208
The court did not make a definitive ruling on the merits since it
dismissed the regulatory takings claim for being filed after the running of
the statute of limitations. In Texas, the 10 year statute of limitations for
adverse possession is borrowed in regulatory takings claims dealing with
the taking, rather than the damaging of property interests .2 The cause of
action accrued when the ordinance was enacted, not when the variance
application was filed. If the ordinance contained a variance procedure, a
regulatory takings claim could not have been filed until a variance was
sought and presumably denied, otherwise the case would not be ripe for
adjudication. But since there was no variance mechanism, the enactment
of the ordinance itself, constituted a final decision of the City regarding
the issuance of drilling permits. The cause of action arose, and the statute
of limitations began to run when the ordinance was enacted, which was
more than 10 years prior to the filing of this suit.
The dicta in Trail Enterprises is reminiscent of a 40 year old deci-
sion with analogous facts that applied the sausage grinder approach to
takings analysis. In City of West Frankfort v. Fullop, 2 10 the Illinois Su-
preme Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordi-
nance which prohibited oil and gas drilling operations within an area in
the watershed of a lake which served as the source of drinking water for
the city. Without much analysis of the impact of the ordinance on the oil
and gas rights, the court focused on the reasonableness of the ordinance
and its objective of protecting the public health. The prevention of pollu-
tion of the largest source of municipal drinking water was clearly an im-
portant public health objective and the court would not second guess the
208 957 S.W.2d at 630 quoting from Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the most
far-reaching of all modem regulatory takings cases insofar as it allows the government to
substantially diminish the value of the property interest being regulated without a finding
of a taking.
209 Id. at 631. See generally Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167,
354 S.W.2d 99 (1961)(10 year statute applies); Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 564
S.W.2d 816 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(two year statute applies).
210 City of West Frankfort v. Fullop, 6 Ill.2d 609, 129 N.E.2d 682 (1955).
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city council's determination that oil and gas drilling operations posed a
threat to the water supply. The court's only discussion of the impact of
the ordinance on the oil and gas operation was "For the fact that the ex-
ercise of the police power precludes the most profitable use of property
in private hands does not make the exercise invalid as such nor render it
invalid as a 'taking' of the primary use, and hence the essence of the
property."21' Since the facts did not show whether or not the mineral and
surface estates were severed, it is hard to determine how the court pre-
sumed that only the highest and best use has been taken, as opposed to
all economically beneficial uses. But if the mineral rights and surface
rights were not severed, the court's analysis was probably correct if one
chose to follow the aggregate approach to takings cases.212
Trail Enterprises, undaunted by defeat in the first round, brought a
second inverse condemnation claim against the city after it enacted a
zoning ordinance amendment that expanded the areal scope of the drill-
ing prohibition. In Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, (Trail II),213
plaintiff sought an inverse condemnation remedy for an oil and gas lease
it held in the newly-covered area. The court identified three bases for
seeking an inverse condemnation award based on the Texas Supreme
Court decision in Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale.214 The first basis was
whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest.
The second was whether the regulation denies the owner all economi-
cally viable uses and the third was whether the regulation unreasonably
interferes with an owner's right to use and enjoy the property interest.
Because the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment,
the court treated plaintiffs well-pleaded facts as true and found that as to
the second (Lucas) and third (Penn Central) bases, triable issues of fact
existed.
In the third round of litigation the trial court again granted the City's
motion for summary judgment on the ripeness issue.215 The Court of Ap-
peals, however, determined that the case was ripe because the enactment
of the ordinance, itself, triggered the regulatory taking in part because
there was no variance mechanism contained therein that would allow an
oil and gas lessee to drill a well within the no-drill zone.216 But rather
211 129 N.E.2d at 687.
212 See text accompanying notes 130-136 supra.
213 2002 Tex.App. LEXIS 1872 (Tex.App.-Houston [ 14 'h Dist.] Mar. 14, 2002) (not
designated for publication).
114 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998).
215 Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 255 S.W.3d 105 (Tex.App.-Waco
2008).
216 The earlier appellate decisions were rendered by the 14"' Court of Appeals in Hous-
ton. This decision, due to a balancing of the caseloads of the Courts of Appeal was ren-
dered by the Waco Court of Appeals.
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than remand the case back for a trial on the admittedly ad hoc factual
claim that a Penn Central taking had occurred, the Court of Appeals ren-
dered judgment in favor of Trail based on an earlier jury verdict. While
recognizing the earlier court's use of Mayhew to define the regulatory
takings tests, the court in this case finds that there has been a com-
pensable damaging of the mineral estate under the Texas Constitution.217
Because the nature of a damaging inverse condemnation claim is analo-
gous to a taking inverse condemnation claim it is hard to understand how
the court could render a monetary judgment on the basis of the appellate
record. 218 The damaging occurs because the no-drill ordinance precludes
Trail from fully exercising its property rights as owner of the mineral
estate. It is hard to understand why the balancing approach of Penn Cen-
tral would not be as applicable to the damaging claim as it would be to
the taking claim but the majority opinion believes that the damaging
claim has been made by Trail.219
The same Houston drilling ordinance challenged in Trail I was the
subject of an inverse condemnation claim in Maguire Oil Co. v. City of
Houston.220 In this case Maguire Oil received several permits to drill
within 1,000 feet of Lake Houston, notwithstanding the city ordinance's
prohibition against such drilling. The city first argued that since the suit
was filed more than 10 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
statute of limitations had run, as it had in Trail L Maguire Oil success-
fully argued that it was not challenging the ordinance but the revocation
of the drilling permits that had been issued within 10 years of the filing
of this claim. The court again remanded the case for trial on the merits of
the inverse condemnation claim.
The trial court again dismissed the inverse condemnation action,
this time based on ripeness grounds. Maguire Oil again seeks judicial
review and again the case is remanded back to the trial court for a resolu-
tion of the inverse condemnation claim on the merits. 221 As noted earlier
ripeness is a key issue in inverse condemnation claims. Under Hamilton
Bank,222 an inverse condemnation case is not ripe unless there has been a
217 Tx.Const.l art. I, § 17.
218 Chief Justice Gray points that out in his dissent to the opinion on the motion for
rehearing after the majority changed the original order which required Trail to convey its
mineral estate to the City to one where Trail gets to keep the mineral estate and the nearly
$ 17 million damage award. 255 S.W.3d at 115.
219 The City of Houston has sought review by the Texas Supreme Court. As of the date
of the writing of this paper the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on the request for
discretionary review.
220 69 S.W.3d 350 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002).
221 Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 243 S.W.3d 714 (Tex.App.-Houston [14'
Dist.] 2007).
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final decision on the development plans and the State has denied com-
pensation. The second prong essentially requires inverse condemnation
claims to be brought in state court. The first prong is needed so that the
court may determine whether the regulation goes too far. The ripeness
issue is not the same as the exhaustion of administrative remedies doc-
trine. In Maguire Oil II, the court finds that the denial of the permit by
the city official is the final act necessary to make the claim ripe. There is
no need for Maguire Oil to seek City Council relief and there is no vari-
ance mechanism provided for in the ordinance which otherwise contains
a total prohibition of drilling in the lake or within 100 feet of the bound-
ary of the lake. fhe court also notes that even if an appeal may have been
allowed, given the total prohibition against drilling that appeal would
have been futile which renders the issue ripe for review.
Under the modem regulatory takings approach, substate unit regula-
tion of oil and gas drilling and production activities should come under
closer scrutiny than in the past. Because many regulatory programs in-
clude absolute prohibitions against drilling where oil and gas may be lo-
cated, the Lucas total taking doctrine may be applicable. Interesting
questions will have to be answered, however, regarding the scope and
extent of the state-created property interest that is allegedly being taken.
Nonetheless as the recent Texas cases point out oil and gas operators are
trying to attack substate regulation of their activities using the regulatory
takings doctrine.
VI. Surface Use and Mineral Severance
Because the surface and mineral estates may be severed, unique
problems can arise when dealing with governmental regulation of surface
activities that have an impact on mineral extraction operations. As a gen-
eral rule, where there is a severance of the mineral and surface estates,
the respective rights of the two owners should be determined by the ex-
press language of the deed severing the two estates. In most circum-
stances, however, the deed severing the two estates will be silent on the
issue of to what extent the mineral owner may use the surface to extract
the minerals. 224 The near-universal view taken by most state courts is that
upon the severance an implied easement of surface use arises to allow the
mineral owner to successfully exploit the mineral resource. The scope
and extent of that implied easement varies from state to state, but is often
couched in terms of the mineral owner having a right to the "reasonable
223 Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412, 8 O.&G.R.
911 (8" Cir. 1958); Landreth v. Melendez, 948 S.W.2d 76, 137 O.&G.R. 170
(Tex.App.-Amarillo 1976). See generally, P. Martin & B. Kramer, Williams & Meyers
Oil and Gas Law § 218 (2003).
224 1 Williams & Meyers, note 223 supra at 198.7. See generally, Bruce M. Kramer,
The Legal Framework for Analyzing Multiple Surface Use Issues, 44 Rocky
Mtn.Min.L.Fdn. L.Rev. 273 (2007).
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use of the surface" subject to having "due regard" for the surface owner's
rights or subject to making "reasonable accommodation" to the surface
owner.2 25 The scope and extent of this common law implied easement
doctrine may be critical in dealing with local regulation because the min-
eral owner may not claim that surface regulation constitutes a regulatory
takin if they still retain reasonable means to exploit their mineral es-
tate.
This problem arises under circumstances where the substate unit
may exercise its eminent domain authority over a surface estate but in-
tentionally chooses not to condemn the mineral estate. The local gov-
ernmental body may want to use the surface estate for a use that may be
incompatible with oil and gas drilling activities. In Texas, this practice
appears to be widespread and has led to a series of cases that have de-
fined the scope of what a local governmental unit may do with its ac-
quired surface estate that will not constitute a regulatory taking.
An important early case, City ofAbilene v. Burk Royalty,227 showed
that not everything a city may do to make it more difficult to drill for, or
produce, oil or gas would necessarily constitute a regulatory taking. The
city condemned the surface estate where Burk Royalty owned the min-
eral estate. The city was expanding its airport. The oil and gas field was
utilizing a secondary recovery waterflood project that Burk argued would
be adversely impacted by the construction activities and by the eventual
expansion of the runways that might require several wells to be disman-
tled. The court rejected the regulatory takings claims. It first found that
the construction activities interference was merely temporary in nature
and therefore not a regulatory taking.228 While temporary regulations
may constitute a "temporary" taking, the length of time the regulations
are in effect will have to be extraordinary in most cases. On the issue of
whether the future height restrictions that will be imposed on structures
in order to accommodate the expanded runway would constitute a taking,
the court basically said there was no such thing as a future taking. There
were no present restrictions in place and whether the future regulations
would constitute a taking could only be determined after they were put
into effect. There was nothing the City had done that interfered with the
225 Id. at §§ 218.7 - 218.8.
226 See Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District v. Banta, 453 S.W.2d 134
(Tex. 1970).
227 470 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1971).
228 This concept that temporary interference with property rights may not necessarily
be a taking was upheld by the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) where the court finds that a
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mineral owner's right to make reasonable use of the surface to exploit the
mineral estate.
The key decision dealing with whether a severed mineral estate has
been taken when there was a condemnation of the surface estate is Tar-
rant County Water Improvement District No. One v. Haupt., Inc.229 This
case involved a rather unique set of facts. The District condemned the
surface and existing oil and gas leasehold estates covering some 92 acres,
of which 80 acres were to be submerged by a lake. Haupt received com-
pensation for his surface estate and the royalty interest taken. The oil and
gas lessee received compensation for its interest. The existing wells were
plugged. The District, however, did not condemn Haupt's possibility of
reverter so when the lease would be extinguished, Haupt would become
the owner of the mineral estate. Haupt then executed a top lease to Bar
J.B.Co. before the surface was inundated and the lessee sought to re-open
the plugged wells. The District then sought an injunction against Bar J.B.
seeking to prevent them from conducting further drilling or re-working
operations anywhere within the 80 acres that were to be submerged. In
the meantime, an oil and gas lessee drilled a directional well from the
"fast" or dry lands to underneath the 80 acre tract. The lower courts
found that there had been a regulatory taking of the mineral interests by
the inundation of the surface estate that, according to these courts, effec-
tively denied the owners reasonable access to the mineral estate.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that before one can determine
whether or not there has been a denial of access to the surface estate, the
court must apply the "reasonable accommodation" doctrine. That doc-
trine required the mineral owner/oil and gas lessee to accommodate the
interests of the surface owner in using the implied easement of access
and use, even if it meant that the mineral owner must expend more
money in doing so. In this case there was evidence that by using direc-
tional drilling or other techniques, the mineral estate underlying the 80
submerged acres could be exploited. The property interest in the implied
easement of surface use did not necessarily include the right to use the
cheapest means of access if it would cause substantial injury to the sur-
face estate. Insofar as governmental ownership situations are concerned,
inverse condemnation actions for the underlying mineral estates will
need to be predicated on an almost total denial of access to the minerals.
Finally, Texas has adopted a rather unique statute relating to mineral
activities in urban areas. 23 0 This statute was enacted in 1983 and recog-
nized the inherent conflict between residential subdivisions and oil and
gas drilling activities. But the statute is not of statewide application.
There are three types of counties where this statute may be applied: 1.
229 854 S.W.2d 909, 119 O.&G.R. 580 (Tex. 1993).
230 Tex.Nat.Res. Code §§ 92.001-92.007.
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Counties with a population in excess of 400,000, 2. Counties with a pop-
ulation in excess of 140,000 that abut a county having a population in
excess of 400,000 and 3. Counties located in part on a barrier island.23'
The statute gives the surface owners of a parcel of land that is not to ex-
ceed 640 acres the power to designate where potential mineral develop-
ment may occur. The surface owners must create a "qualified subdivi-
sion" by having a plat approved by the Railroad Commission and filing
that plat with the clerk of the county in which the subdivision is lo-
cated.232
The plat must designate a two-acre parcel for each 80 acres subdi-
vided as an "operations site."233 The plat must also comply with the re-
quirements of the relevant substate governmental unit. The Railroad
Commission must hold a hearing on the plat application and give notice
to all surface and mineral owners within the affected area.234 The statute
also authorizes directional drilling to be utilized from either outside of
the "qualified subdivision" or from a designated "operations site" so long
as the operations do not unreasonably interfere with the use of the sur-
face. 235 The limitation on drilling outside of the "operations site" will
terminate within 3 years of Commission approval unless the surface
owner commences actual construction of roads and a lot within the sub-
division has been sold to a third party.236 Once platted, approved and ac-
tions taken within the 3 year period there is no time limit on how long
the restrictions will apply.
To date there have been no challenges to this statute. One can hy-
pothesize a circumstance where a mineral owner might argue that the
designated "operations site" did not allow it to effectively produce the oil
and gas lying beneath the subdivision. Such regulatory takings claims
will be judged under Haupt to determine if the restrictions did anything
more than define the scope or extent of the implied easement under tradi-
tional regulatory takings doctrine. There is no doubt that the statute clear-
ly serves an important public purpose, the issues would be whether there
is a total Lucas taking of all economically feasible uses or an ad hoc
Penn Central taking that looks to such matters as reasonable investment-
backed expectations.
231 Tex.Nat.Res. Code § 92.002(3). Ernie Bruchez states that the following 12 counties
meet one of the three tests: Bexar, Dallas, El Paso, Harris, Tarrant, Travis, Brazoria, Den-
ton, Fort Bend, Montgomery, Collin and Galveston. Bruchez, note I supra.
232 Id. at §§ 92.005, .003, .005.
233 Id. at § 92.002.
234 Id. at § 92.004.
235 Id. at § 92.005(b).
236 Id. at § 92.005(c).
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